at 11-12. As pointed out by Dr. Pickar, defendant's illness existed independently of, and predated, his addiction to narcotics. Id. at 11-12, 14-15, 50. Accordingly, it must be concluded that defendant committed the crimes to which he pled guilty while suffering from a schizophreniform disorder. Furthermore, as previously stated, Dr. Pickar testified that defendant's mental condition and his reaction to psychotropic medication contributed to his drug use and aggravated it, and that his drug use contributed to and aggravated his mental condition. Transcript at 13-14, 18-19, 26 (Oct. 23, 1989).
The government argues that 5K2.13 cannot properly be applied to defendant because it contends that, despite defendant's history of mental illness, he would not have trafficked in drugs if he had not voluntarily involved himself in cocaine. Because his addiction to cocaine and his mental illness were interrelated causes of his trafficking in drugs, the government contends, no factual predicate for departure exists. The government's argument, however, is defeated by the plain language of the relevant Guideline.
Guideline 5K2.13 calls for reduction of defendant's sentence to "the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense." It does not require that the reduced mental capacity be demonstrated to be the sole, or "but for," cause of the commission of the offense. Indeed, introduction of such a concept would run contrary to the settled proposition of law that an event may result from the confluence of many factors operating at the same time and that, in such a case, each may be a proximate cause. See, e.g., Murphy v. United States, 209 U.S. App. D.C. 382, 653 F.2d 637, 648 n. 48 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 187 U.S. App. D.C. 73, 570 F.2d 982 (D.C.Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1121, 98 S. Ct. 3069 (1978). Consequently, that defendant's mental illness and drug addiction may both have contributed to the commission of the offense does not bar application of 5K2.13 to reduce defendant's sentence to the extent that defendant's mental illness contributed to the commission of the offenses.
The government also argues that defendant's two prior narcotics offenses demonstrate the need for defendant's incarceration to protect the public and, therefore, that 5K2.13 is inapplicable to defendant. However, it is clear that defendant's untreated mental illness, for which he is now receiving appropriate treatment, was in large part responsible for these offenses. It should also be noted that, whatever sentence is imposed on defendant in the instant cases, defendant will be forty-three by the time of his release from prison in North Carolina. In addition, under the statutory mandatory minimum for defendant's offense of possession with intent to distribute, when defendant reaches the age of 48, he will not only have served ten years of imprisonment but he will also have been subject to five years of supervised release, both of which should provide him with medication and other treatment for his mental illness. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),(b). Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be said that the full period of incarceration required by unmitigated application of the Guidelines is necessary to protect the public. Whether or not the sentence imposed departs from the Guidelines, the public will be adequately protected at least until defendant is 48 years old. The risk which he would pose to the public after that age is doubtful. In fact, the public would more likely be more burdened by the responsibility of caring for defendant in prison at great expense as he passed from middle age (48) to old age (77) while serving a full 25-year sentence subsequent to his 10-year North Carolina sentence which unmitigated application of the Guidelines would authorize.
Defendant is therefore eligible for departure from the Guidelines on account of his diminished capacity. The Guidelines provide for such a departure to "the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense." § 5K2.13. Dr. Pickar testified that defendant's commission of the offenses was caused, to the best of his expert knowledge, approximately 50% by his mental illness and 50% by his addiction to drugs. Transcript at 56 (Oct. 23, 1989). Mechanistic application of Dr. Pickar's conclusion to Guideline 5K2.13 would therefore reduce the applicable Guideline range for defendant's Count II offense to between 94 and 117 1/2 months. Such a sentence, however, would impermissibly place defendant below the 120-month statutory minimum established by 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),(b). On the other hand, application of the mandatory minimum of 120 months, would produce an appropriate sentence, as confirmed by testing that sentence by the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):
(1) As stated, the nature and circumstances of the offense are in tension with the characteristics of the defendant.
(2) Incarceration of a 33-year old cocaine addict with schizophreniform for ten years without parole plus five years of supervised release will, in my judgment,
(A) reflect the seriousness of defendant's offense, promote respect for law, and provide a just punishment for the offense;
(B) afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct in that fully competent offenders will know that they would face the much harsher penalties required for them by the Guidelines, while other mentally impaired addicts who would traffic in drugs will not likely be deterred by knowing of this or any other sentence, no matter what its length;