defendant does provide the Court with a letter from the OHR to plaintiff dismissing plaintiff's administrative complaint for lack of prosecution on February 28, 1989. Thus, plaintiff obviously did not withdraw it herself before filing this lawsuit, the OHR did not dismiss it for administrative convenience, and plaintiff's HRA claim must be dismissed under the election of remedies doctrine. See Parker, 697 F. Supp. at 7.
2. The Battery Claim
In Count IV of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant Salamone committed a battery against her. Defendant argues that this claim also is barred by the statute of limitations, and the Court agrees. The statute of limitations for a battery claim is one year. D.C.Code § 12-301(4). The limitations period for a tort begins to run on the date of the injury. Shehyn v. District of Columbia, 392 A.2d 1008, 1013 (D.C. 1978). Although plaintiff does not indicate the date on which the alleged battery occurred, it must have occurred before April 1, 1987, when Salamone retired from his position at IBEW. Her claim for battery thus was not filed within the one-year limitations period and must be dismissed.
3. The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Defendants argue that plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and that it, too, is time-barred. The D.C.Code does not provide a specific limitations period for such an action, but does provide that the statute of limitations for actions "for which a limitation is not otherwise specifically prescribed [is] 3 years." D.C.Code § 12-301(8). However, this court has consistently held that the limitations period for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is determined by the limitations period prescribed for the underlying conduct giving rise to the claim, where the emotional distress claim arises out of the conduct. See Rochon v. F.B.I., 691 F. Supp. 1548, 1562 & n. 19 (D.D.C. 1988); Thomas v. News World Communications, 681 F. Supp. 55, 72-73 (D.D.C. 1988); Doe v. Yogi, 652 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D.D.C. 1986); Burda v. National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors, 592 F. Supp. 273, 281 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 248 U.S. App. D.C. 415, 771 F.2d 1555 (D.C.Cir. 1985); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 550 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 233 U.S. App. D.C. 384, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 84 L. Ed. 2d 377, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
Plaintiff by her own admission states that "it is clear that the conduct giving rise to the claim in this case was the Defendants' violation of Plaintiff's rights under Title VII - prohibiting sexual discrimination and harassment." (Plaintiff's Opposition at 9.) She refutes defendants' argument that the emotional distress claim is based on her battery and HRA claims, and that it is thus barred by a one-year statute of limitations. However, "to the extent that her emotional injuries were the result of the stressful work situation created by the defendant, her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress [must be] dismissed as subsumed within Title VII. . . ." Stewart v. Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (D.D.C. 1982) (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 444, 641 F.2d 934, 946 n. 12 (D.C.Cir. 1981)); see also Green v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (D.D.C. 1986).
Accordingly, Count III must be dismissed.
4. Class Action
In Count V of her amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants have engaged in a pattern of sexual discrimination against a class consisting of hundreds of female employees. Defendant IBEW has moved to strike the allegations in Count V on the ground that plaintiff has failed to move for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1). In response, plaintiff has moved for a stay of her obligations under Local Rule 203 until discovery has been completed.
Local Rule 203 provides:
(b) Motion for Certification. Within 90 days after the filing of a complaint in a case sought to be maintained as a class action, the plaintiff shall move for a certification under Rule 23(c)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the case may be so maintained. In ruling upon the motion, the court may allow the action to be so maintained, may deny the motion, or may order that a ruling be postponed pending discovery or other appropriate preliminary proceedings. A defendant may move at any time to strike the class action allegations or to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff's amended complaint was filed on March 15, 1989. She argues, however, that she cannot move for class certification until after she has had adequate time for discovery.
However, the 90-day limit of the local rule has been strictly enforced in this Circuit. See McCarthy v. Kleindienst, 239 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 741 F.2d 1406, 1411 (D.C.Cir. 1984); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 67, 661 F.2d 1243, 1279 (D.C.Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1381, 102 S. Ct. 3505 (1982); Coffin v. Sec'y of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 400 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1975). Plaintiff has not offered any compelling reason why the local rule should not be followed in this case. Even if she needed to conduct further discovery, she could have moved for class certification and requested that the Court postpone its ruling. See Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1279 ("ongoing research need not have precluded a motion for class certification."). Accordingly, plaintiff's class action allegations are stricken, and her motion for a stay of her Rule 203 obligations is denied.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Date: January 24, 1990
ORDER - January 24, 1990, Filed
Upon consideration of defendants' partial motion to dismiss, defendant IBEW's motion to strike class action allegations, the oppositions thereto, and the entire record herein, it hereby is
ORDERED, that defendants' motions are granted for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Opinion. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the discovery stay imposed by the Court on July 14, 1989, is lifted.