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WILLIAMS v. FEDERAL LAND BANK OF JACKSON

January 31, 1990

KATHLEEN SAUNDERS WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND KATHERINE SAUNDERS WILLIAMS, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH GEORGE SAUNDERS, DECEASED, Plaintiffs
v.
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF JACKSON, FEDERAL LAND BANK ASSOCIATION OF JACKSON, and FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ASSISTANCE BOARD, AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM CAPITOL CORPORATION, Defendants



The opinion of the court was delivered by: PARKER

 (Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P.)

 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 BACKGROUND

 This is an action initiated by plaintiffs, residents and citizens of the State of Mississippi, against the Federal Land Bank of Jackson ("FLB"), its parent association, the Federal Land Bank Association of Jackson ("FLBA"), the Farm Credit System Capitol Corporation ("Capitol Corporation"), a company created to advise and assist the local institutions and the Farm Credit System Assistance Board ("Assistance Board"), a successor in interest to the Capitol Corporation.

 The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that defendants wrongfully refused to release security in certain farm land serving as collateral for plaintiffs's indebtedness to the Federal Land Bank of Jackson ("Bank") and that the refusal caused plaintiffs to suffer injury. They seek relief under theories of breach of contract and torts law, including: intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with business expectancy, negligence and breach of duty.

 Plaintiff Kathleen Saunders Williams, individually, alleges that she has, as a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, suffered severe emotional distress which has manifested itself in diminished familial relations, neglect of business and family responsibilities, as well as various other psychological and physical problems.

 Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6). For defendants to prevail on this motion to dismiss, it must appear that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claims which would entitle them to relief. Dismissal is appropriate only if, upon viewing the allegations of the pleadings in the light most favorable, it appears as a matter of law that plaintiffs cannot prevail under any set of facts. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404, 89 S. Ct. 1843 (1969).

 For the reasons discussed below, the Court decides that the defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.

 ANALYSIS

 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

 The amended complaint alleges that "jurisdiction is vested in this Court by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 2012(4), 12 U.S.C. § 2033(4), 12 U.S.C. § 2258 [portions of the Farm Credit Act of 1971, ("Act") as amended] * * * and [12] C.F.R. § 611.1142(b) [regulation promulgated under the Act]." The amended complaint also discloses that plaintiffs rely on an alleged violation of another regulation promulgated under the Act, 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(d)(1), as the foundation for all of the causes of action against the defendants. The amended complaint clearly puts forward the Act as the vehicle for relief.

 However, several courts have concluded, and indeed plaintiffs have conceded, that no implied right of action exists under the Act. Bowling v. Block, 785 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Russellville PCA, 777 F.2d 1544, 1546-48 (11th Cir. 1985); Kolb v. Naylor, 658 F. Supp. 520, 525 (N.D.Iowa 1987). Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' complaint. *fn1" Nevertheless, because plaintiffs assert that their action is based in common law, the Court considers the other ground for dismissal advanced by defendants.

 Defendants are federally chartered instrumentalities, governed and regulated by federal statutes and by rules and regulations promulgated by the Farm Credit Administration ("FCA"), which is an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States government. The FCA determined that these defendants were insolvent and, on May 20, 1988, it appointed a receiver pursuant to authority vested in it by 12 U.S.C. § 2183(b). The duties, powers and authority of the receiver are prescribed in 12 C.F.R. §§ 611.1161 and 611.1171. ...


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