do not meet the criteria for the executive or administrative exemptions.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Fair Labor Standards Act covers employees of the government of the District of Columbia. 29 U.S.C. § 203(c) (1982) ("State" means any state of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or possession of the United States).
Section 7(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a) requires that all covered employees be paid not less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for any hour worked more than 40 hours in a week.
2. The Act has a series of exemptions from the coverage of its overtime provisions. Section 13(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(a)(1), states that an employer need not pay overtime under Section 7 if an employee works in a "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity." It does not appear that Supervisory Housing Inspectors could colorably fit into an exemption other than for executive or administrative employees; in any event, the District of Columbia has not suggested that they do. Defendant advances only the executive exemption as the basis for not paying Supervisory Housing Inspectors overtime under the Act. Going defendant one better, plaintiffs argue that they meet neither the executive nor the administrative exemption.
3. The cases make clear that defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiffs and other Supervisory Housing Inspectors are exempt. D'Camera v. District of Columbia, 693 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (D.D.C. 1988) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196, 94 S. Ct. 2223, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1974), Idaho Sheet Metal Works v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 209, 15 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 737 (1966), and Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1986)).
As stated in D'Camera, FLSA exemptions are to be construed narrowly against the employers. Id. In the end, deciding whether an employee is exempt must be a voyage through fact-bound waters. Although there are a great many stars of law to navigate by, the course turns on the facts of an employee's job duties. Unfortunately for defendant, its position that plaintiffs are exempt is caught between the devil of contrary facts and a deep blue sea of detailed regulations. Frankly, the Court finds it hard to believe that anyone who heard plaintiffs' testimony would conclude that they are executives. Indeed, neither of the two witnesses who opined that plaintiffs are exempt, met with them or reviewed their duties in detail before making a decision about their status under FLSA. The statute, the regulations under it, and the cases confirm this common sense impression.
4. FLSA gives the Secretary of Labor the power to define and delimit the terms bona fide executive or administrative capacity. The Secretary has done so at 29 C.F.R. § 541.1, §§ 541.101-119 (executive) and 29 C.F.R. § 541.2, §§ 541.201-215 (administrative).
The Secretary's regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 establish a long and a short test of whether a worker fits the executive exemption. As relevant here, the long test states that an employee must receive a salary and:
(1) have as a primary duty the management of the enterprise in which he is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof, 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a); and
(2) customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other employees, § 541.1(b); and