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05/30/90 MARGARET ANN BUBLIS v. DISTRICT COLUMBIA

May 30, 1990

MARGARET ANN BUBLIS, PETITIONER
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RESPONDENT



Petition for Review of an Order of the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services

Schwelb and Farrell, Associate Judges, and Kern, Senior Judge.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Farrell

D.C. Code § 46-111 (a) (1987) provides, in part, that "any individual who left his most recent work voluntarily without good cause connected with the work, as determined under duly prescribed regulations, shall not be eligible for [unemployment compensation] benefits . . . ." By regulation, the Director of the Department of Employment Services has determined that among the "reasons considered good cause connected with the work for voluntary leaving" is:

Illness or disability caused or aggravated by the work; Provided, that the claimant has previously supplied the employer with a medical statement. . . .

7 DCMR § 311.7(e) (1986). In this case, the Director sustained an appeals examiner's interpretation of this regulation as requiring that the employee have supplied the employer with "medical documentation" in the form of a physician's statement or its equivalent explaining the illness or disability and consequent need for voluntary leaving. The Director further sustained the examiner's finding that petitioner had failed to supply the required statement. Mindful of our limited scope of review of agency action, we nevertheless are constrained to hold that, in the circumstances of this case, the determination that petitioner failed to furnish a "medical statement" is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole. D.C. Code § 1-1510 (a) (3)(E) (1987). We therefore reverse the denial of benefits.

I.

From November 1979 to September 1988, petitioner was a Health Education/Community Outreach Social Worker for the East Coast Migrant Health Project (ECMHP). The job apparently required her to change assignments and move to different migrant worker locations in southern states every six months or so. *fn1 According to the Employer's Statement submitted in connection with petitioner's request for unemployment benefits, in September 1988 petitioner "advised ECMHP she would not accept the position for which she had signed an agreement for (Nashville, N.C.) at the advice of her doctors." At the hearing before the appeals examiner, Dr. John Bartlett testified that petitioner came to his psychiatric clinic in North Carolina on June 17, 1988, complaining of anxiety attacks and an inability to drive her car, which her work required, because of fear and the feeling "that her current life situation was too stressful for her to bear." He diagnosed her as suffering from a major depressive episode, and advised her that "she would he unable to recover from her depressive episodes if she continued to work at [her present] job."

Petitioner apparently was hospitalized briefly, and toward the end of June received a note in the hospital from ECMHP's Assistant Administrator, Helen Kavanagh, stating: "Marge[,] Hang in there and get some rest. We're with you on this. Give a call when you need a cheery hello!" *fn2 A month later, ECMHP's Administrator, Sister Abhold, wrote petitioner inquiring, "How is your mother? She must be pleased that you are at home with her and helping the healing process with you . . . ." On July 29, 1988, petitioner forwarded a note to ECMHP from a psychiatrist stating: "Mrs. Bublis should remain of [sic; on] leave of absence (sick leave) for 6 add'l weeks." On September 19, 1988, Helen Kavanagh wrote to petitioner "capsulizing" a telephone conversation they bad a few days earlier. The letter confirmed that since petitioner's sick leave and vacation time would expire by September 30, she would then be on a leave of absence from ECMHP, but that, "since you also indicated that there is a strong possibility that you will not continue with ECMHP as strongly suggested by the three doctors you have been working with, ECMHP will need to know within a month's time whether or not you plan to continue." Petitioner left the employment of ECMHP on or about September 30.

At the hearing on petitioner's claim for benefits, Sister Abhold acknowledged that petitioner had called her and told her of the June depressive episode, and informed her that the doctor was recommending she go into another kind of work. Sister Abhold explained, however, that ECMHP had "never received any medical evaluation of [petitioner's] condition," only the physician's note recommending six more weeks of sick leave, and that petitioner had presented no "medical documentation" of any kind to the employer. Petitioner testified that she had been unaware "any of these things were needed" but believed the employer "understood [her situation] in September after my telephone call"; she had been reluctant to provide further details to the employer "because of the confidentiality of anyone seeking help for a psychological or psychiatric problem."

The appeals examiner found that petitioner

did not tell her employer the full reason for her resignation. She did not present any medical documentation concerning her health problem, because she wanted to keep the matter confidential. The employer was given a doctor's statement that said she would be unable to work for six weeks, but it did not elaborate on why the claimant would be out from work.

The examiner construed the "medical statement" regulation as requiring that the employer be furnished with a physician's statement or equivalent documentation establishing an objective connection between the employee's illness or disability and the employment. The Director upheld this determination.

II.

On more than one occasion, we have emphasized that "generally, the [unemployment compensation] statute should be construed liberally, whenever appropriate to accomplish the legislative objective of minimizing the economic burden of unemployment." Green v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 870, 875 (D.C. 1985), quoting Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Labor, 409 A.2d 164, 170-71 (D.C. 1979). See also Cohen v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 83 U.S. App. D.C. 222, 223, 167 F.2d 883, 884 (1948 ("the Unemployment Compensation Act be interpreted in accordance with its purpose"). Still, benefits under the statute are not available merely for the asking, and with particular reference to D.C. Code § 46-111 (a), the Director has determined, permissibly, that a claimant who leaves his employment voluntarily has the burden of proving "good cause connected with the work for the voluntary leaving." 7 DCMR § 311.4; see Hockaday v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 443 A.2d 8, 11 (D.C. 1982). One reason the employee may advance is disability or illness "caused or aggravated ...


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