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08/03/90 CHESTER L. HARDY v. UNITED STATES

August 3, 1990

CHESTER L. HARDY, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES, APPELLEE



Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Hon. Evelyn E.C. Queen, Trial Judge

Rogers, Chief Judge, Terry, Associate Judge, and Gallagher, Senior Judge.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Terry

Appellant Hardy appeals from the denial of his motion to correct and reduce Sentence. *fn1 He contends that a condition of probation imposed in this case created a possibility of multiple punishments for a single offense and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. We agree, and therefore we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate the offending condition of probation.

I

Hardy was charged by information with possession of cocaine, a controlled substance, in violation of D.C. Cede § 33-541 (d) (1988). He pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of attempted possession of cocaine and in due course appeared before Judge Queen for sentencing. After allocution, he was sentenced to pay a $200 fine and to serve one year in jail. Execution of the jail term was suspended, however, except for the first thirty days. In lieu of the remaining jail time, Hardy was given eighteen months' probation following his release, on condition that he maintain his employment, continue in a drug treatment program, and commit no further law violations during the term of his probation. Additionally, as a condition of his probation in the instant case, Hardy was ordered to "comply with the restitution order imposed in M-11480-86 by Judge Taylor."

In case No. M-11480-86 Hardy had been charged with destruction of property. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was given a suspended sentence, with two years' unsupervised probation. Judge Taylor, the sentencing Judge in that case, also ordered Hardy as a condition of his probation to pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $1100. At the time of sentencing in the instant case, Hardy had not fully or timely complied with that restitution order.

After sentencing in the instant case, Hardy filed a motion to correct and reduce sentence, which the trial court denied. Hardy now contends, as he did below, that his sentence in this case exposes him to double jeopardy because a failure to pay the restitution originally ordered in case No. M-11480-86, and again in the instant case, may subject him to double punishment, i.e., the possibility that his probation may be revoked in both cases for a single act (or failure to act).

II

D.C. Code 16-711 (1989) expressly authorizes a sentencing court to require a defendant to make restitution to his or her victim as a condition of probation. See Sloan v. United States, 527 A.2d 1277, 1289 (D.C. 1987). *fn2 What happened here, however, is that after the sentencing Judge ordered restitution as a condition of probation in case No. 1, another Judge ordered the same restitution to the same victim as a condition of probation in case No. 2, even though that victim had nothing to do with case No. 2. We hold that the action of the second Judge violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits, inter alia, "multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1969) (footnote omitted); accord, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S. Ct. 1013, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232 (1975); Carter v. United States, 497 A.2d 438, 441 (D.C. 1985); Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 129-130 (D.C. 1985).

The order to pay restitution which the Judge in the second case imposed as a condition of probation creates a very real likelihood of multiple punishment. For a single omission -- the failure to pay the restitution ordered in case No. M-11480-86 -- Hardy faces the prospect of having his probation revoked in both cases. This court has held, however, that "hen a probationer violates a condition of his probation, the only appropriate sanction is a withdrawal of the previously afforded favorable treatment rather than the imposition of an additional penalty." Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C. 1989). What that means here is that, if Hardy were to violate the restitution order imposed as a condition of probation in case No. M-11480-86, "the only appropriate sanction" for that violation would be the revocation of his probation in that case. The trial court's error here was in tying the two cases together so that a violation of probation in the first case could result in revocation of probation in the second as well as the first. "he imposition of an additional penalty," revocation of Hardy's probation in the second case, is impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause. *fn3

We find no material difference between this case and In re R.L.C., 114 Wis. 2d 223, 338 N.W.2d 506 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). In In re R.L.C. a juvenile was ordered to pay restitution as a condition of probation, but he did not comply with the condition before his probationary term ended. Later he was arrested on a different charge and, after pleading guilty, was again sentenced to probation As a condition of probation in the second case, he was ordered to pay the restitution that he had not paid in the first case. The Court of Appeals held that this duplicative condition violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because it exposed the respondent to punishment in the second case solely for failing to comply with the restitution order in the first case. Id. at , 338 NW.2d at 507-508.

Although the facts here are somewhat different, we think the rationale of R.L.C. applies with equal force in the case at bar. Hardy was appropriately ordered in case No. M-11480-86 to pay restitution because of his conduct in that case, on pain of having his probation revoked. Then, however, he was ordered again, by a second Judge, to pay restitution to his victim in No. M-11480-86, subject to having his probation revoked in this case. As in R.L.C., Hardy now faces the possibility that his probation may be revoked in two separate cases for a single act or omission, which "amounts to being punished twice for the same offense." Id. at , 338 N.W.2d at 508.

The duplicative condition imposed in the instant case is invalid for yet another reason. Whereas Hardy originally received only a six-month suspended sentence in No. M-11480-86, Judge Queen's terms of probation subjected him to the possibility of one year in prison for the offense in that earlier case. Consequently, a failure to make restitution in No. M-11480-86 could subject Hardy to a longer period of incarceration than he would ever have to serve under Judge Taylor's sentence, even if Judge Taylor revoked his probation. Additionally, Judge Queen's order created the anomalous possibility that Hardy's probation might be revoked for failure to make restitution after he was no longer required to make restitution in M-11480-86, contrary to a recent decision of this court:

oday we make explicit what has previously been implicit in our decisions and hold that, under D.C. Code 24-104, a trial court cannot revoke probation after the expiration of the probationary term originally imposed, unless the court extends the period of probation, or ...


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