GEORGE H. REVERCOMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
The plaintiff, a former West Point cadet, was separated from West Point on June 14, 1990. Prior to taking this action, the Army held a Full Honor Investigative Hearing (FHIH) on January 29, 1990 concerning allegations of lying and cheating. Complaint para. 6. The FHIH panel determined that the plaintiff had violated the Cadet Honor Code by cheating and later denying that she had cheated. Id. The Staff Judge Advocate of the Military Academy conducted a legal review of the FHIH proceedings and forwarded the findings of the FHIH panel to the Superintendent of the Academy. Id. para. 7-8. On March 5, 1990, the Superintendent approved the findings and forwarded them on to Army Headquarters. Id. para. 9. The Army notified the plaintiff of its approval of her separation from the Academy on June 14, 1990. Id. Ex. 6.
Subsequently, on June 25, 1990, plaintiff's counsel wrote to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, who had previously assured plaintiff's family that he would give the findings of the FHIH his "personal review." The letter inquired whether the Army's review was complete. Plaintiff's counsel indicated the plaintiff intended to pursue the case in Court once the action was final and did not want to bring such an action prematurely. Complaint Ex. 5. The Army did not respond to this letter.
Plaintiff filed this action on July 11, 1990, asserting several procedural and evidentiary flaws in the FHIH proceedings. On October 10, the defendant moved to dismiss. The Army argues that the plaintiff has not requested a correction of her military records by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (BCMR). The Army asserts that the BCMR has the power and authority to grant plaintiff all the relief she seeks, including reinstatement in the Academy. Accordingly, the Army argues that the plaintiff must or should be required to exhaust her administrative remedies before prosecuting this action.
The Court finds that this case is governed by the decision of the Circuit Court in Bois v. Marsh, 255 U.S. App. D.C. 248, 801 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In Bois, the court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies before the BCMR was required before a former member of the Army could bring suit for declaratory relief to correct her military record. The Court explained:
Although the need for military discipline by no means precludes judicial review of all military matters, the Supreme Court has instructed us that "civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers." . . . This teaching reinforces the well-established principle "that a court should not review internal military affairs in the absence of . . . exhaustion of available intraservice measures."