made because the government reneged on its promise to give the defendant the opportunity to cooperate with the government's investigation and, thereby, to qualify for a "substantial assistance" departure from the statutory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Because the government did not accept the defendant's offer to provide substantial assistance, the defendant claims that the government breached the bargain.
It is beyond dispute that "when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S. Ct. at 499. See also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984). In other words, if a government's promise was a factor in persuading the defendant to plead guilty, the "defendant's plea loses its consensual character if such promise is not fulfilled." U.S. v. Griffin, 641 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd, 259 U.S. App. D.C. 383, 816 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
However, in order to invalidate the plea for lack of knowing and voluntary consent, the defendant must show that the government promised to negotiate with him, and that this promise, either in whole or in part, induced him to plead guilty. The Court finds that no such promise was made to the defendant. Although the defendant was involved in discussions with the government prior to entering his guilty plea (ST at 2), the defendant does not allege that the government promised to negotiate with him for any particular length of time, or under set of any circumstances.
In essence, the defendant asks the Court to require the government to negotiate with him, even after the government determines that further discussions would not be useful. This the Court cannot do. Just as the government has "broad discretion" in determining whom to prosecute, see, e.g., Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985), citing, U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2492, n. 11, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982), the government has broad discretion in determining whether its resources are wisely spent by continuing discussions with any particular informant. Courts are ill-equipped to examine "the Government's enforcement priorities," and "the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607, 105 S. Ct. at 1530. Absent any evidence that the prosecutor's decision to discontinue discussions was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or arbitrary classification", Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S. Ct. 663, 668, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978), the Court will not second-guess the prosecutor on a matter committed to the prosecutor's discretion.
The defendant's argument also fails because, even if afforded the opportunity to provide substantial assistance, he did not plead guilty in reliance on the prosecutor's promise to recommend a § 3553(e) departure. The colloquy at the bench, after the Court accepted the plea, makes this clear:
MR. RUDASILL: Your honor, I would like these proceedings sealed, not the whole proceedings but the bench conference. My client is seeking to enter into cooperation with the government under 3553(e). There may be some necessity to extend the sentencing date because of his cooperation.