Highway Commission v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U.S. at 199-200.
In conclusion, because the Board is an arm of the District of Columbia government and because Krieger cannot establish jurisdiction over an arm of the District of Columbia through pendant party jurisdiction, see Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d at 416, Krieger's claims against the Board must be dismissed. Accordingly, the accompanying order will grant the Board of Trustees' motion to dismiss and dismiss the claims against it.
Trane also moves to dismiss the claims against itself. In its original papers, Trane argued that if the District of Columbia were dismissed from this action the whole case would have to be dismissed. It is, however, well-settled that "so long as a . . . party is not indispensable to the action, a district court may dismiss only the claim against that party and retain jurisdiction over the rest of the case." Id. at 416. Because it is equally well-settled that joint tortfeasors are not indispensable parties, see, e.g., 7 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1623, at 342 & n. 2 (2d ed. 1986), Krieger may proceed against Trane even though his claims against the District and against the Board have been dismissed.
Trane also contends that this action should be dismissed in favor of a pending parallel state action. It points out that this case involves only issues of state law, that Krieger will suffer no prejudice or disadvantage from having his claims adjudicated across the street in Superior Court, that the state action was filed at the same time as the instant complaint, and that the state action is more comprehensive because the Superior Court has jurisdiction over the Board. It is not clear that these factors constitute the sort of "'extraordinary and narrow exceptions to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it'" that would justify dismissal of an action based upon considerations of wise judicial administration. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483, 96 S. Ct. 1236 (1976) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1163, 79 S. Ct. 1060 (1959)). Although the factors cited by Trane indicate that on balance it would be more efficient to conduct these proceedings in state court, the Supreme Court has stressed that "the balance [is] heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Mercury Const., 460 U.S. 1, 16, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 103 S. Ct. 927 (1983).
It is not, however, necessary to resolve this issue. Krieger has represented to the Court that he filed parallel complaints "due to some uncertainty . . . regarding the legal question of whether the District was subject to this Court's diversity jurisdiction" and that he "has no intention of proceeding with two identical law suits in two separate courts." Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum at 10 - 11. Based upon that representation, the accompanying order will dismiss plaintiff's claims against Trane and deny Trane's motion to dismiss as moot.
ORDER -- May 22, 1991, Filed
For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is this 22d day of March, 1991 hereby
ORDERED: that Motion of the Board of Trustees of the District of Columbia to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be, and is hereby, granted; and it is further
NOTICED: that, in light of the above ruling, plaintiff does not oppose defendant Trane's motion to dismiss; and it is further
ORDERED: that the Motion of Defendant the Trane Company to Dismiss should be, and is hereby, granted; and it is further
ORDERED: that plaintiff's complaint should be, and is hereby, dismissed.