CHARLES R. RICHEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is the defendant Ramsey Winch Co.'s ("Ramsey") Motion to Quash Service and to Dismiss Due to Lack of Jurisdiction, and Motion to Transfer Venue, plaintiffs' Opposition thereto, defendants' Reply, and Supplemental Memoranda submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants in the above-captioned action. Defendants argue that they lack the minimum contacts with the District of Columbia ("District") necessary to subject them to personal jurisdiction in the District under the constitutional requirements of due process and the District of Columbia's long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423 (a)(4).
Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties, their arguments before this Court on June 26, 1991, and the entire record herein, the Court shall deny the defendant's motions. The Court finds that the defendants have sufficient contacts with the District of Columbia to warrant personal jurisdiction in this case.
The plaintiff Lakie Ray Fogle, Jr. alleges that he sustained serious injuries while using a winch on a tow truck in the District of Columbia in April, 1988. He alleges that the winch was defective and seeks damages from the manufacturer and distributor. The manufacturer, defendant Ramsey, an Oklahoma corporation, argues that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia because Ramsey lacks sufficient contacts. Ramsey cites a variety of factors to support this proposition: it is not incorporated in the District, has no place of business in the District, the product in question was not purchased in the District, Ramsey's sales volume in the District was "negligible", Ramsey does not advertise "locally", etc. In addition, the defendant argues that there is no nexus between Ramsey's contacts with the District and the claim for relief, because the plaintiff bought the winch in Alabama, and was living in Virginia, where his business was located and the winch was delivered, when the accident "fortuitously" occurred in the District. Ramsey further argues that venue is improper.
The plaintiff offers a different interpretation of the nature of the defendant's contacts with the District, and argues that they are sufficient to warrant jurisdiction. He notes that the injury in question occurred in the District. Plaintiff argues that Ramsey winches are used in the District; that Ramsey itself claims in its advertisements that Ramsey winches are on "about eight out of ten tow trucks today," presumably including tow trucks in the District. Ramsey regularly advertises in national consumer and towing & wrecking industry magazines, most of which are sold over-the-counter in Washington, D.C.
The Court heard oral arguments from the parties on the motion on July 26, 1991, after which the parties submitted supplementary memoranda addressing the issue of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff must show that the exercise of jurisdiction here both comports with the constitutional requirements of due process and satisfies the requirements of the D.C. long-arm statute.
A. Constitutional Requirements
Due process requires that a defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state such that being sued there comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945). The defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980).
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court held that there was no personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma against a New York automobile retailer whose sales were limited to New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, and where the retailer never sought to serve the Oklahoma market in any way. Jurisdiction could not be based solely on the fortuitous circumstance that the car happened to break down while passing through Oklahoma. Id. The Court limited its holding, stating that
if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.
444 U.S. at 297-98.
In this case, the use of the winch in the District of Columbia arose from the efforts of Ramsey to market its winches nationally, including inside the District. While Ramsey has no distributors within the boundaries of the District, Ramsey has two distributors in the Washington, D.C. area, one in Maryland, and one in Virginia. Its national advertisements reach consumers in the District. Ramsey claims that approximately eight out of ten tow trucks use Ramsey winches. Moreover, twenty-seven percent of Ramsey's sales are to large manufacturing accounts that use the winches in products they manufacture. Ramsey did not specify where these goods are distributed; most likely they are distributed nationally. For all of these reasons, Ramsey should have expected that its winches would be purchased by consumers in the District, and thus should have anticipated being haled into court there.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987), four members of the Supreme Court supported the proposition that placing a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is insufficient to warrant jurisdiction. There must be an action of the defendant "purposefully directed toward the forum state." Id. at 112, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984). Even under this stricter approach, Ramsey is subject to jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. Ramsey did not manufacture a product that just happened to wind up in the District. Rather, Ramsey's marketing approach envisions and boasts the omnipresence of its winches throughout the country. It took affirmative steps to achieve these results, many of which are outlined above. Given the national sweep of Ramsey's market, it seems more fortuitous that Ramsey does not have a distributor in the District than that the plaintiff was using a Ramsey winch there.
A number of other factors may be considered in determining the reasonableness of jurisdiction in a given case, including the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. Asahi at 1033. Here, a number of factors indicate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ramsey is reasonable. As the site of plaintiff's injury, the District of Columbia has an interest in preventing defective products from crossing its borders and causing injuries. The plaintiff also was hospitalized in the District immediately following his accident. Plaintiff's treating neurosurgeon and neuropsychologist have their offices in the District as well. The plaintiff's witnesses are located in the D.C. area. See Gatewood v. Fiat, S.p.A., 199 App. D.C. 238, 617 F.2d 820, 827-28 (1980). While Virginia might appear to be a viable alternative forum, the residence of the plaintiffs no longer constitutes proper venue in a diversity action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a).
For all of the reasons given above, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant Ramsey comports with constitutional requirements.
B. The District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute
Having met the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the requirements of the District of Columbia long-arm statute are met. The statute states in relevant part that:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's . . .
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.