On Report and Recommendation of the Board of Professional Responsibility.
Steadman and Farrell, Associate Judges, and Mack, Senior Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals Board on Professional Responsibility ("Board") recommends disbarrment of respondent Fortunato Mendes pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a) (1989 Repl.). Section 11-1503 (a) requires the disbarrment of any member of the bar who is convicted of a criminal offense involving "Moral turpitude." Pursuant to statutory requirements and the rules of this court, the final disbarrment may not issue until after judgment of final appeal in the criminal case, however, appellant has been suspended since our order of July 13, 1989. D.C. App. R. XI, Section 10(d); D.C. Code § 11-2503 (a) (1989 Repl.).
Respondent was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, D.C. Code § 33-541 (1989 Repl.), and of carrying a pistol without a license, D.C. Code § 22-3204 (1989 Repl.). On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. See Mendes v. United States, No. 89-706, Memorandum Opinion and Judgment (D.C. July 16, 1991).
The Board has concluded that respondent's conviction in the Superior Court of possession with intent to distribute cocaine involved a crime of moral turpitude, and therefore warrants disbarment. Upon examination of this report and the record on which it was based, we accept the findings of the Board and adopt its recommendations. Such report is appended to this decision.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in this jurisdiction and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys authorized to practice before this court. *fn1
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the Matter of: FORTUNATO MENDES, RESPONDENT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Respondent was found guilty in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of D.C. Code § 33-541, and carrying a pistol without a license, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204. On May 18, 1989, Respondent was sentenced to serve 20 months to five years and fined $5,000 on the drug charge and on the gun charge, one year, which was to be served consecutively.
On July 13, 1989, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals suspended Respondent from the practice of law pursuant to Rule XI, § 15(1) and (4). In its order of suspension, the Court requested that the Board institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed and review the elements of the crimes of which Respondent was convicted to decide whether or not the crimes involved moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C. Code § 11-2503(a). In the opinion of the Board, one of the crimes of which Respondent stands convicted, namely, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, does on its face involve moral turpitude and therefore Respondent must be disbarred pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-2503(a).
In In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1168 (D.C. 1979) (en banc), the Court defined moral turpitude to mean "the act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted code of mankind," or whether the criminal act is one of "baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in ...