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12/09/91 ELEASE RICHBOW v. DISTRICT COLUMBIA

December 9, 1991

ELEASE RICHBOW, APPELLANT
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE



Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; Hon. Harriett R. Taylor, Trial Judge.

Before Ferren, Schwelb and Farrell, Associate Judges.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Farrell

FARRELL, Associate Judge : In this medical malpractice action in which the personal representative was substituted for the deceased plaintiff, the jury found by special verdict that the defendant District of Columbia provided negligent care and treatment to Joe Richbow following his surgery at D.C. General Hospital in 1976, but that the District's negligence did not proximately cause Mr. Richbow's ensuing injuries. On appeal, appellant's primary contentions are that the trial Judge should have granted her motion for a new trial on evidentiary grounds, and should not have permitted one of the deceased plaintiff's physicians to testify as an expert witness on behalf of the defendant. We affirm. *fn1

I.

In May of 1976, staff at D.C. General Hospital removed a pre-cancerous tumor known as a villous adenoma from the colon of Joe Richbow, who was then 63 years old. *fn2 He was released from the hospital, and the insufficiency of the follow-up care offered or provided by D.C. General gave rise to the jury's finding of negligence. Nearly four years after the operation, Mr. Richbow complained to a physician treating him for another illness that he was experiencing rectal bleeding of the kind that had resulted in the first operation. The physician referred Mr. Richbow to Dr. Warren Strudwick, a general surgeon with considerable expertise in oncology. Dr. Strudwick discovered a villous adenoma in Mr. Richbow's colon in the same area where the previous tumor had been found. *fn3 Dr. Strudwick believed that this tumor, larger than the first, was probably malignant, and recommended an abdominal perineal resection and colostomy -- an operation entailing removal of the affected portion of the colon, closure of the anus, and establishment of a stoma, an artificial opening in the pelvic area through which bowel waste can be excreted. Mr. Richbow submitted to this operation on April 16, 1980.

Complications immediately ensued. Over the next four years, these resulted in successive operations to improve the colostomy and the creation of a second stoma. In 1985, a new polyp was discovered in Mr. Richbow's transverse colon. Although this was diagnosed as a non-malignant villous adenoma, the manifest failure of the colostomy and Mr. Richbow's apparent preDisposition to developing these pre-cancerous lesions caused the doctors to perform an ileostomy on him. This involved removal of the rest of the colon and attachment of the end of the small intestine to yet a third artificial opening in the pelvic wall. Still further corrective procedures were required after this operation, and Mr. Richbow continued to experience pain and discomfort until 1988. *fn4 No claim of malpractice was made against Dr. Strudwick or the doctors who treated plaintiff after 1980. Rather, the pain, expense, and embarrassment attending Mr. Richbow's colostomy and the complications which ensued were alleged to have been proximately caused by the failure of D.C. General Hospital to provide proper follow-up care between 1976 and 1980, which would have permitted earlier discovery of the second tumor and inferentially less radical procedures to cure it. The jury found that although D.C. General was negligent in its follow-up care, that negligence was not the proximate cause of Mr. Richbow's injuries.

II.

Appellant did not move for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but argues instead that the Judge should have granted her motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. This argument need not detain us long. When the trial court denies a motion made on this ground and sustains the jury's verdict, our scope of review "is very narrow indeed." Felton v. Wagner, 512 A.2d 291, 295 (D.C. 1986) (citing Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1111 (D.C. 1986)). See Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 535 (D.C. 1979) (appellate review is restricted where "trial court's unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial coalesces with the deference properly given to the jury's determination of such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial Judge, for her part, may set aside a verdict supported by substantial evidence and grant a new trial only when the verdict is against what variously has been described as the "clear" or "great" weight of the evidence. Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 99 App. D.C. 205, 209, 239 F.2d 25, 29 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 942, 1 L. Ed. 2d 760, 77 S. Ct. 816 (1957); Winter v. Brenner Tank, Inc., 926 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1160 (D.C. 1987) (applying clear weight of the evidence standard on review of denial of new trial motion).

In this case, the jury's special verdict on causation means that it found that the District's failure to periodically monitor plaintiff following the 1976 operation did not substantially cause the need for the colostomy operation; plaintiff would have had to undergo the same surgery whether the hospital staff furnished proper follow-up care or none at all. Appellant's primary claim is that this finding is unsupported by an expert opinion rendered within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. We need not decide, however, whether Dr. Strudwick, whom the District called as its expert, rendered such an opinion. *fn5 It was plaintiff, not the defendant District of Columbia, who was required to establish the elements of the malpractice claim by expert testimony. Washington v. Washington Hosp. Center, 579 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 1990) (expert testimony usually required to establish each element of medical malpractice claim). In general a jury is not bound by the testimony of any witness, even an expert. District of Columbia v. Howard, 588 A.2d 683, 690 (D.C. 1991) (citing cases); Insurance Co. of North America v. GMR, Ltd., 499 A.2d 878, 883 (D.C. 1985) (citing cases). Although an expert's testimony may not arbitrarily be disregarded or disbelieved, Rock Creek Plaza-Woodner Ltd. v. District of Columbia, 466 A.2d 857, 859 (D.C. 1983), when there is some basis in the record for concluding that an expert witness should not be credited, we will not pit our judgment against that of the finder of fact who saw and heard the witness testify. See id.

Appellant introduced expert testimony through Dr. Lawrence Feinman that if the second lesion had been detected at an early stage, measures short of a colostomy would have sufficed and the extensive surgery from 1980 onward could have been avoided. There was, on the other hand, ample evidence from which the jury could resolve to reject that Conclusion. Whether or not Dr. Strudwick rendered a contrary expert opinion, he made clear that he would have recommended the same treatment for Mr. Richbow if any size tumor had reoccurred in the portion of the colon previously affected. See note 5, (supra) . This was not merely the opinion of a doctor who taught surgery, who had been associated with the Howard University tumor clinic for over twenty years, and who had published papers on cancer, but the opinion of a physician who had actually examined and treated plaintiff and had personal knowledge of his medical history. See Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 658 (D.C. 1985) (non-party treating physician may testify about opinions developed in course of treatment even if not listed as expert on Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26 (b)(4) statement). The jury was entitled to give this opinion substantial weight in assessing the adequacy of Dr. Feinman's expert opinion. *fn6 Moreover, there was additional evidence, including testimony from Dr. Feinman himself, which would allow the jury to find readily that: (1) plaintiff was of an age and physical makeup that predisposed him to develop colon tumors; (2) the 1976 operation failed to eradicate completely the pre-cancerous lesion in Mr. Richbow's colon; (3) the tumor grew back; (4) the 1980 operation was medically necessary; and (5) the location of the tumor and the fact of its reappearance would have made an abdominal perineal resection and colostomy medically appropriate even if the tumor had been detected earlier. Under the requisite standard of review, and even if we assume the District adduced no expert testimony on the issue of causation, it cannot be said that the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence so as to require a new trial. *fn7

III.

Appellant further contends that it was error for the court to permit Dr. Strudwick to render an expert opinion on negligence and causation over the plaintiff's objection. Appellant concedes that Dr. Strudwick could properly testify as a fact witness for the defense. But she argues that permitting a non-party treating physician to testify as an expert in these circumstances violates the physician-patient privilege embodied in D.C. Code § 14-307 (1989) even if the patient does not object to the physician's factual testimony. We find no merit in this argument.

D.C. Code § 14-307 (a) provides that

a physician . . . may not be permitted, without the consent of the person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to disclose any information, confidential in its nature, that he has acquired in attending a client in a professional capacity and that was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, whether the information was ...


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