of Appeals explicitly rejected a similar argument in Guerra, 786 F.2d at 416 . There, the Court of Appeals held that, in a challenge by a group of prisoners to the duration of their confinement because of the U.S. Parole Commission's calculation of parole eligibility, the U.S. Parole Commission was not the prisoners' custodian. Therefore, the D.C. District Court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The Court observed:
It is clear that the Parole Commission is responsible for the appellees' continued detention. Were the Commission to decide to change the prisoners' parole eligibility dates today, they might be freed. But this power does not make the Commission the prisoners' custodian in the sense of the habeas corpus statute. Appellees argue that because the Commission has the power to release them, the Commission is their custodian. But their argument extends to any person or entity possessing some sort of power to release them. Under appellees' theory, the Attorney General of the United States could be considered the custodian of every prisoner in federal custody because he supervises the Federal Bureau of Prisons. . .We have specifically rejected this interpretation.
Id. (citations omitted). In Chatman-Bey this holding was reaffirmed: "it should be abundantly clear that habeas petitioners. . .cannot properly bring suit against such officials as the Attorney General and such entities as the Parole Commission. Rather, the proper defendant in federal habeas cases is the warden." Chatman-Bey at 811.
The Court of Appeals has evidenced no inclination to carve out an exception to this principle for D.C. Code offenders, and in the absence of such an exception, this Court is not free to create one. The Court further notes that D.C. Code offenders incarcerated in other jurisdictions have been able to bring habeas petitions for good-time credits in the federal district courts where they are held, see, e.g., Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1989), while at least one other judge in this district has held that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the habeas petition of a D.C. Code offender held in a distant jurisdiction. See Gilliard v. Barry, 1989 WL 10612 (D.D.C. 1989) (Penn, J.) (involving claim seeking good time credits).
A careful evaluation of the nature of this case and the existing law has lead the Court to conclude, reluctantly, that this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The amended complaint does not name the plaintiff's custodian, the warden of the Federal Correctional Institution in Ashland, Kentucky, and even if it did, this Court would lack personal jurisdiction over that individual. However, the Court knows of no reason why it cannot urge the defendants to reconsider their regulation precluding D.C. Code offenders held outside of the District from being awarded educational good time, consistent with the recent statutory amendments awarding them institutional good time. But because, under the case law of this Circuit, this is not the proper forum for the resolution of plaintiff's claim, this Court can do no more.
In light of the foregoing, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this case shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.
The Court profoundly appreciates the service and professionalism of Roxane N. Sokolove, Esq. and her able associate from the law firm of Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld. In view of the Court's action herein, Ms. Sokolove is hereby discharged from her appointment to represent the plaintiff. The Court also thanks government counsel for his professionalism and help in resolving this matter.
The Court shall issue an appropriate Order on this date in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion.
January 17, 1992
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 782 F. Supp. 653.
ORDER - January 17, 1992, Filed
In accordance with the Court's Memorandum Opinion in the above captioned action filed on this date, and for the reasons stated therein, it is, by the Court, this 17 day of January, 1992,
ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, shall be, and hereby is GRANTED, and the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), this case shall be, and hereby is, transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that this case shall be, and hereby is, DISMISSED from the dockets of this Court; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that in view of the Court's action herein, appointed counsel for the plaintiff, Ms. Roxane Sokolove of the law firm of Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld shall be, and hereby is, discharged from her representation of the plaintiff.
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE