medical facilities and performing official duties . . . In itself is a sufficient basis on which to invoke Feres immunity." Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 514 (D.D.C. June 22, 1978).
In the case before the Court, there is no dispute that plaintiff Jill Antoine is bringing a tort claim against the Government for injuries alleged to have occurred due to the negligence of military doctors working at military medical facilities and performing official duties. Thus, it necessarily follows that the Government is not liable for any injuries stemming therefrom by application of the Feres doctrine.
C. Necessity of the Feres Rationales
The plaintiff then argues in the alternative that Feres does not control because "none of the rationales underlying the Feres doctrine apply in this case." Opposition at 5. This Court disagrees. The Supreme Court has recently rejected the notion that inquiry beyond the determination that the injuries in question were sustained "incident to service" is required to invoke the Feres bar. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 97 L. Ed. 2d 550, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987). In Stanley, the Court stated that "[a] test for liability that depends upon the extent to which particular suits would call into question military discipline and decision making would itself require judicial inquiry Into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters." Id. at 682. That Court said further that "the mere process of arriving at correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime." Id. at 683. The Court went on to say "the 'incident to service' test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters." Id. at 683.
Thus, this Court's inquiry stops at a finding that the activity, in which an active duty service member was engaged when injured, was "incident to service." Finally, plaintiffs concede that plaintiff Gregory A. Antoine's claim is derivative to plaintiff Jill A. Antoine's and is, thus, also barred by the application of the Feres doctrine. See e.g., Lombard v. United States, 223 App. D.C. 102, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1347, 103 S. Ct. 3086 (1983).
In summary, use of military medical facilities, by itself constitutes activity "incident to service" sufficient to invoke the Feres doctrine's bar to the bringing of a tort claim under the FTCA, by a member of the United States military against the Government. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate, on its merits, the claim now before it. For these reasons, this Court finds for the defendant in granting the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. It is so ordered.
This case now stands DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Joyce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge
DATE: JAN 31 1992