must note that Soberal-Perez is not binding authority in this Circuit. However, even assuming arguendo that Soberal-Perez correctly interprets Title VI, the agency's claim must fail; the funds provided to the political parties for their conventions meet the criteria espoused in Soberal-Perez because the FEC monies enable the party to provide a platform for other, ultimate beneficiaries, such as Republican candidates and party members.
Finally, the agency contends that, in enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Congress expressed its intention that the public financing of political campaigns would not allow for government regulation of the conduct of a political party's internal affairs. The agency's resort to the legislative history of the Federal Election Campaign Act is unavailing in that nothing in the legislative history suggests a Congressional desire to prevent the FEC from enforcing the provisions of Title VI.
For all of these reasons, the Court shall grant the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I of the Complaint and shall direct the FEC to conduct a rulemaking process, with all deliberate speed, so that the Plaintiffs may receive the benefit of the agency's views as to the implementation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prior to the August 1992 National Republican Convention in Houston, Texas.
Accordingly, it is, by this Court, this 7th day of April, 1992,
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Count I of the Complaint shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned case shall be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the Defendant agency; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that, with all deliberate speed, the Defendant agency shall begin rulemaking proceedings designed to consider the means through which the FEC will ensure compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as amended; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the above-captioned case shall be, and hereby is, DISMISSED from the dockets of this Court, without prejudice to the right to make oral application to reopen within thirty (30) days of the final action of the Defendant agency.
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE