energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.
Id. (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Tellingly, in neither its original Motion 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Tellingly, in neither its original Motion for a Preliminary Injunction nor in its Renewed Motion does Southland cite a single case showing it to be entitled to injunctive relief for the sorts of harms it claims it has suffered and will suffer pending the outcome of this litigation.
It is, moreover, fundamental that "'the basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.'" Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 , 94 S. Ct. 937 (1974) (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07, 3 L. Ed. 2d 988 , 79 S. Ct. 948 (1959)). Not only has Southland failed to show that it will suffer irreparable harm, it also has adequate remedies at law. A Writ of Replevin has already been issued to it, by which it has protected its interests in the inventory of the store. Any other losses occasioned by the Godettes' malfeasance or failure to abide by the terms of the Franchise Agreement, if proven, will entitle Southland to recover damages. In short, this is not a case in which the equitable powers of this Court should be invoked.
Such a conclusion is all the more warranted given the existence of an arbitration clause in the very Franchise Agreement which Southland now seeks to enforce. This clause by its own terms applies to controversies such as those that are at issue here: breach of contract, fraud and embezzlement (tort claims), claims based upon federal law (the Trademark Act of 1946), and claims based upon state or local law (the D.C. Franchising Act of 1988). Moreover, as the Court reads this provision, arbitration is mandatory and binding in the event the parties cannot mutually such controversies "shall be settled by individual arbitration in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association." Pl.'s Ex. 1 P. 31 at 31 (emphasis added). Finally, Southland's assertion that the Godettes have waived their rights under this clause is without merit. The Godettes have demanded arbitration based upon Southland's issuance of a notice of termination on less than 30 days notice. According to the terms of the arbitration clause, in such cases a demand must be made "prior to any other notice of termination becoming effective." Id. (emphasis added). Arguably, Southland's termination of the Franchise Agreement has yet to become effective, because Southland still seeks specific performance of its terms against the Godettes. Even if one were to date effective termination from the execution of the Writ of Replevin, on or about May 1, 1992, the Godettes' demand (made April 28, 1992) would still be timely. Southland cannot now simultaneously seek to enforce against the Godettes some of the terms of the Agreement it bargained for while avoiding being itself bound by other terms.
The Court will treat the Godettes' Motion in Opposition to Granting of Preliminary Injunction, filed April 28, 1992, as a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, which the Court will grant over Southland's oral opposition made at the May 11th hearing. The Court is well satisfied that the arbitration clause in the Franchise Agreement is within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., and should be given full effect. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 478, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488 , 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED, that plaintiff Southland Corporation's Renewed Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED; and, it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that the parties are to PROCEED TO ARBITRATION in accordance with the terms of the arbitration clause in the Franchise Agreement executed between the parties the 26th day of March, 1985.
GEORGE H. REVERCOMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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