The opinion of the court was delivered by: STANLEY S. HARRIS
The case is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment and plaintiff's opposition thereto. On consideration of the entire record and for the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This case concerns allegation of fraud and undue influence, breach of the warranty of habitability, breach of the duty to repair, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the defenses of statue of limitations and laches.
They also have moved to dismiss all of plaintiff's causes of action for failure to state a claim. Finally, defendants have moved for summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff's claim of fraud and undue influence and on plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against defendant James Greenfield.
The following facts are taken from plaintiff's complaint. On May 6, 1954, Bessie Adams and her husband became owners of the property at 119 E Street N.W., Washington D.C. (the E Street property). Adam's husband took care of all financial matters for the couple, including all matters relating to the purchase and subsequent mortgage payments for the E Street property. Adams became the sole owner of the property when her husband died in 1957. Adams first met defendant Bernard Greenfield in 1959, when he inquired about purchasing the E Street property. Greenfield is an attorney and a member of the District of Columbia bar whose primary business is buying and selling real estate. Adams, a black woman, was in her seventies at the time and, she alleges, was functionally illiterate.
Adams and Greenfield had several meetings regarding the E Street property at which no one else was present. Greenfield insisted that they be alone during their discussion and refused to speak with either of Adams's children. Adams refused to sell the property to Greenfield. However, Greenfield agreed to assume the note secured by a mortgage on the house, and to allow Adams to live there for the rest of her life. In return, Adams agreed to pay Greenfield $ 75.00 a month.
Greenfield presented Adams with a contract that he claimed memorialized their agreement, and she signed the contract based on his representations. In fact, the document was a contract of sale for the property. Greenfield advised Adams not to show the document to anyone, and she did not until 1988.
Adams continued to live at the E Street property until April 30, 1965. At that time, Greenfield again presented her with a document which he told her to sign and not to show to anyone else. He described the document as an agreement for her to move out of the E Street property temporarily so that he could perform renovations. She signed the document, which in fact was a deed conveying her right to reside at the E street property in exchange for $ 10.00. Adams moved from the E Street property to a house owned by Greenfield at 625 New Jersey Avenue (the New Jersey Avenue residence).
The day after she moved, Greenfield razed the E Street property.
Adams lived at the New Jersey Avenue residence for 25 years. During that time, the condition of the house continuously declined despite her repeated requests for repairs. In the spring of 1988, Adams filed a complaint with the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, Housing and Environmental Regulation Administration. As a result of the complaint, a District of Columbia housing inspector inspected the New Jersey Avenue residence and found 70 violations of the Housing Code. Although Greenfield was notified of the violations, most of the necessary repairs were never made.
Instead, both defendant Bernard Greenfield and defendant James Greenfield threatened to evict Adams and attempted to force her to move out of the New Jersey Avenue residence.
In September 1988, Adams contacted Legal Counsel for the Elderly. She showed the 1959 contract and the 1965 deed to an attorney who read the documents to her. Plaintiff first learned the contents of the documents on the occasion.
Defendants deny most of plaintiff's material allegations. Bernard Greenfield contends that Adams was not functionally illiterate. He further contends that he explained the terms of both the 1959 contract and the 1965 deed to Adams and that he encouraged her to circulate the documents to her relatives. Greenfield denies making any false representations regarding the contents of the documents to Adams. According to Greenfield, Adams was interested in obtaining a life tenancy at low rent and therefore she agreed to sell the E Street property.
Defendants raise three statute of limitations defenses. First, defendants argue that the statue of limitations bars plaintiff's cause of action for fraud and undue influence. Under District of Columbia law, and action for fraud must be brought within three years of "the time the right to maintain the action accrues." D.C. Code § 12-301(8). The statute of limitations for an action for fraud begins to run when the fraud is or should have been discovered though plaintiff's due diligence. Kropinski v. World Plan Executive Council - US, 853 F.2d 948, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1988). When the alleged fraud was or should have been discovered depends on the facts of the particular situation, Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and is an issue for the jury to resolve, see Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 11124, 1135-36 (d.C. 1987); Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 940 (D.C. 1986). Defendants bear the burden of showing that plaintiff has not met the due diligence standard. Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
The events underlying plaintiff's fraud and undue influence claim occurred in 1959 and 1965. Adams the complaint in this action 1990. Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Adams discovered the contents of the contract and the deed. Citing Adams's age, illiteracy, and reliance on Greenfield, plaintiff contends that the statue of limitations was tolled until 1988. Defendants dispute plaintiff's factual assertions and contend that plaintiff knew or should have known of the facts underlying her claim before 1988. Defendants' contentions highlight the existence of genuine issues ...