because of the events which allegedly occurred in May of 1991 and led to the grievant's step III suspension. (Plaintiff's post-hearing brief at 8-9.) Since the arbitrator found that step III of the progressive discipline had not been met, he found he could not uphold the discharge under the provision of the Agreement allowing for progressive discipline.
Under the applicable standard of review, there is no evidence in the record to support disrupting the arbitrator's decision regarding the step IV discharge. The arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was a rational one. This is all that is needed to satisfy the standard. Therefore, there is no basis on which this court properly can overturn the arbitrator's decision regarding the burden of proof needed to sustain a step IV discharge.
Having found that the Hospital had not met its burden of proof under progressive discipline, the arbitrator examined the discharge under the more exacting standard of § 3.1. The Hospital, however, contends that the arbitator did not rule on all three of the charges against the grievant, any one of which could sustain a discharge under § 3.1. The Court finds that the arbitrator did rule on all three counts before him.
The charge of intimidating a fellow employee was based directly on the events that allegedly occurred at step III. The Hospital contends that an employee was intimidated by the mere presence of the grievant. This employee was said to have found the grievant's presence intimidating because of events which led to the step III suspension. (Plaintiff's post-hearing brief at 8-9.) Since the arbitrator found that there was insufficient evidence to support the allegation at step III, he reasonably found no evidence upon which to uphold a § 3.1 discharge for intimidating that employee.
The two other charges against the grievant were for unauthorized absence from his assigned work area and presence in an unauthorized area. While it is true that the arbitrator did not fuly spell out his reasons for sustaining the grievance on these counts, he was not required to do so. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598 ("Arbitrators have no obligation . . . to give their reasons for an award."). The arbitrator did state that "there is insufficient evidence to indicate that the employer's expectations or the consequences for the Grievant's failure to meet those expectations were ever adequately communicated to the Grievant." (Arbitrator's Op. at 6.) It is clear to this Court from the opinion in its entirety that this statement refers to the rules regarding how the grievant was to sign out of his work area and where he was allowed to go when he did. In addition, there is ample evidence in the record to support the arbitrator's conclusion.
Finally, the Union has asked the Court to award back pay to the grievant beyond that which was granted by the arbitrator and is provided for in the Agreement. The Union claims that the limit on back pay which can be awarded under the Agreement was nullified with respect to this action when the Hospital refused to reinstate the grievant on the arbitrator's order over six months ago. This Court has no authority to grant the relief requested. The Agreement is clear. Back pay for more than 100 days can "never" be awarded. (Section 10.2 of the Agreement.) This provision is not contrary to public policy. The Union agreed to the provision and it is now bound by it. All of defendant's requests for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees are also denied.
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and the defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Stanley S. Harris
United States District Judge
Date: AUG 18 1992