are properly commenced only in the Court of International Trade and not in a district court.
H.R. Rep. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3729, at 3745.
A reading of the FTZ Act demonstrates that at the very least the business of FTZs falls within (i), (1), (2) and (4). The FTZ Act is directly concerned with regulating duties, in part through the special zones established in the areas of larger ports. It should also be noted that the FTZ Act is of little guidance if one seeks to determine governing standards for grants to new FTZs, particularly those that may have competitive consequences. This is largely a matter of expert administration and is within CIT's reviewing authority, subject to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, except as to revocation.
If this Court were to accept continuing jurisdiction based on the Administrative Procedure Act it would hold, in effect, that two Article III courts whose decisions are subject to appellate review by different appellate courts were intended to have concurrent jurisdiction to review the FTZ Board as to many FTZ activities, since any challenge to the grant of an FTZ may have procedural, factual or purely legal aspects, depending on the facts and circumstances. While there is no provision explicitly justifying review of any grant, if there is jurisdiction anywhere surely it is not in this Court since many aspects of such a review fall exclusively to CIT.
The Court is satisfied that the jurisdictional requirements reviewed above placed review of revocation in the appropriate Court of Appeals, in this case the Eleventh Circuit. Revocation differs from grants. Standards for revocation, constitutional and otherwise, have been well developed over the years. But since promotion of international trade is but a precatory objective and FTZs are concerned with shifting tariffs, duties and import conditions, all other review of the Board's actions were intended to be exclusively in CIT, a specialized court. It is for that Court to define the scope of its jurisdiction over FTZ grants, not this U.S. District Court.
It can be persuasively argued that if a district court has jurisdiction, this case must be transferred to the Eleventh Circuit. See Supplemental Brief filed by defendant. But this Court is qualified to determine its jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 702 and venue exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Standing has been accepted because plaintiff is regulated by the Board, its injury is not unduly speculative and the issue required prompt resolution for the speedy and fair administration of justice.
The complaint is dismissed, without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
October 8, 1992.
Gerhard A. Gesell
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 803 F. Supp. 442.
ORDER - October 8, 1992, Filed
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
Gerhard A. Gesell
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
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