Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; (Hon. Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, Trial Judge)
Before Terry and Sullivan, Associate Judges, and Pryor, Senior Judge, in chambers.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
PER CURIAM: This matter came before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary reversal and summary affirmance. On consideration of those motions, and the responses thereto, it is
ORDERED that appellants' motion for summary reversal is denied. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that appellees' motion for summary affirmance is granted, and the order dismissing appellants' complaint is hereby affirmed for the reasons stated in the trial court's order of April 7, 1992, which we adopt and incorporate herein by reference. That order is reproduced as an appendix to this opinion.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIVIL DIVISION
WILLIAM A. SIMPSON, et al., Plaintiffs v. JACK BAKER, INC., et al., Defendants
This matter is before the Court on defendant Jack Baker, Inc.'s motion to dismiss the complaint. Upon consideration of defendant's motion, plaintiff's opposition thereto, all subsequent replies, and the record herein, the motion is hereby GRANTED.
Defendant essentially moves to dismiss on the grounds that the suit is barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations. Plaintiff does not dispute that the suit was untimely filed. Plaintiff initially relies on ongoing settlement negotiations to justify the delay in filing suit. However, plaintiff has not alleged any actions on behalf of defendant to induce delay. Plaintiff simply, in hopes of settlement, on its own failed to file suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court cannot set aside the statute of limitations based on ongoing settlement negotiations.
Plaintiff next argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to pending workmen's compensation claims both in the District of Columbia and in Maryland. The defendant in the instant case is not plaintiff's employer but rather a third party with regard to the workmen's compensation claim. Plaintiff directs our attention to D.C. Code § 36-335, which states, in pertinent part:
(a) If, on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable under this chapter, the person entitled to such compensation determines that some person other than those enumerated in § 36-304 (b) is liable for damages, he need not elect whether to ...