his association with other suspects in that case. Detective Hamann prepared a written statement and before having the defendant sign the statement, again read to the defendant his Miranda rights.
At the hearing on the motion, both the government and the defense counsel acknowledged that the defendant was in custody when the police officers questioned the defendant. Mr. Hammond was handcuffed to the floor of an interview room at the MPD Homicide Branch. Unquestionably, he was "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966.)
The question for the Court to decide is whether or not Mr. Hammond was deprived of his constitutional right to protection against self-incrimination. Because the Court finds that the initial questioning by Detective Gregory was coercive, unwarned and self-incriminating, the defendant's oral and written statements must be suppressed. The Court finds that the defendant's statements made to Detective Gregory prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings must be suppressed. The Court further finds that the oral and written statements made by the defendant after he received Miranda warnings must be suppressed because the statements were not knowingly and voluntarily made in accordance with the requirements established by Miranda and its progeny.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court concluded that "unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. Here, the Court finds that no such protective devices were employed and that Mr. Hammond was coerced into confessing that the drugs in Apartment #104 belonged to him.
Detective Gregory entered the interview room and informed Mr. Hammond about the type and amount of drugs recovered, he then indicated that the potential penalty for this offense was a minimum of ten years. Detectives Gregory and Hamann told the defendant that "it shone a bad light on Annette Middleton," that they knew and he knew who the drugs belonged to, and then the detectives asked him what he wanted to do. Despite the police officers' testimony that the defendant thereafter "spontaneously" admitted that the drugs were his, the Court finds that the defendant's statements were the direct result of the not-so-subtle implications of the detectives' statements to the defendant. See United States v. Green, 776 F. Supp. 565, 567-568 (D.D.C. 1991) ("Because the car was registered in his mother's name, it was reasonable for [the defendant] to perceive this comment as an indirect threat to his mother. Facing this coercive pressure, and surrounded by police officers, [the defendant] responded to the question."). Like the defendant in U.S. v. Green, it was reasonable for Mr. Hammond to perceive the detectives' statements as an indirect threat to his girlfriend, Annette Middleton, the mother of his daughter.
The government points to Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985) to support its argument that even if the defendant's initial confession was involuntary and unconstitutionally obtained, the defendant's oral and written statements made after he was given his Miranda rights should not be suppressed because they were obtained pursuant to a valid waiver of his Miranda protections. The Court finds that Oregon v. Elstad does not help the Government. In that case, the defendant's initial admission was made in an uncoercive situation, prior to arrest, by a defendant who was only a "suspect" at the time. Here, Mr. Hammond was under arrest for murder, in the custody of homicide detectives and handcuffed to the floor of a small interview room. These custodial conditions, coupled with the manipulative statements made to the defendant preclude any argument that this defendant confessed in an uncoercive environment. Cf. Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980) (Supreme Court held that the suspect in this case was not subject to custodial interrogation when police officers talked between themselves in the suspect's presence and then the suspect, on his own initiative, confessed to the location of a murder weapon.).
The Court finds that the defendant's statements subsequent to his waiver were not "voluntary in the sense that [they were] the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
Pursuant to the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress all his oral and written statements. Furthermore, the Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress the tangible evidence. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum.
JUNE L. GREEN
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 30, 1993
ORDER - March 30, 1993, Filed
Upon consideration of defendant's Motion to Suppress, the government's opposition, the supplemental memoranda submitted by the government and the defendant, and the March 29, 1993 hearing on the motion, it is by the Court this 30th day of March, 1993
ORDERED that the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence and statements is granted in part and denied it part; it is further
ORDERED that the oral and written statements of the defendant are suppressed; and, it is further
ORDERED that the physical evidence is not suppressed and is admissible at trial.