of plaintiff's actual motivation in bringing suit, however, an examination of the scope of relief actually and reasonably sought by the complaint supports plaintiff's argument. The complaint principally requested the Court to "reinstate Plaintiff for the length of time required for full hazardous duty retirement benefits to vest" and to "order that Defendant make Plaintiff whole for lost wages and benefits." Thus, the complaint apparently did not contemplate relief beyond that provided pursuant to the settlement agreement: it sought reinstatement only to the point of entitlement to full retirement benefits; and its request for back wages must be construed as limited to that same period, since wages for a given period obviously could not be awarded in addition to retirement benefits.
There is a sense in which this case is unlike an ordinary civil rights case resulting in a favorable settlement for the plaintiff. The settlement here occurred as a result of resolution of the retirement eligibility issue, which is collateral to the issue of discrimination. Because of the injection of this issue into the case, defendant's agreement to the terms of settlement cannot be said necessarily to represent a calculus based on the merits of the discrimination claim. Nevertheless, the settlement agreement justifies plaintiff's requested award, for several reasons. First, as noted, plaintiff did receive essentially all the concrete relief he sought as redress for his discrimination claim. Second, settlement agreements in general do not necessarily reflect the merits of the underlying claim, but frequently depend on extrinsic, strategic considerations. Finally, the discrimination claim and the retirement eligibility claim were closely tied together, and the extensive administrative and judicial proceedings in this case were necessary for plaintiff finally to obtain the relief he sought.
Defendant further argues that plaintiff should not be compensated for the preparation of motions on which he did not prevail. However, under Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, fees are to be reduced for unsuccessful claims, and only if those claims are "separable." The motions at issue were tied to the common core of facts constituting the discrimination claim and produced progress toward the eventual resolution of that claim. Similarly, the attorney time spent in administrative proceedings was necessary to the federal proceedings and is therefore compensable. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 556-61, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986).
The hourly rate and number of hours claimed by plaintiff's counsel are reasonable, and, for the reasons stated above, plaintiff is entitled to a fully compensatory fee award. Plaintiff will therefore be awarded $ 108,709.50 in attorneys' fees.
Finally, plaintiff has adequately supported his revised request for costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Plaintiff's Reply, at 9-11. Accordingly, plaintiff will be awarded $ 2,445.15 in costs.
For the foregoing reasons, it is this 17th day of May, 1993, hereby
ORDERED: that plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs should be, and is hereby, GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED: that plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $ 108,709.50 and costs in the amount of $ 2,445.15.
Louis F. Oberdorfer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - May 18, 1993, Filed
This is an action brought against the United States Marshal Service (USMS) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.,. By Order dated August 14, 1991, the complaint was further amended to allege a claim for law enforcement retirement benefits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8336(c)(1). The USMS denies the material allegations in the complaint as amended and denies any liability.
The parties seek to resolve the differences between them without further litigation, and hereby agree as follows:
(1) Counsel for Plaintiff and the USMS hereby acknowledge that they will execute a Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with prejudice, upon the completion of the relief provided in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4.
(2) The USMS shall reinstate retroactively Plaintiff Petite for the period July 11, 1985 to August 20, 1985, enabling Plaintiff Petite to be employed as a United States Deputy Marshal past his fiftieth birthday. Backpay for this period shall be paid to Plaintiff Petite and all deductions required to be withheld for benefits, including Plaintiff's retirement contribution, health coverage and life insurance as appropriate shall be deducted. The USMS shall pay its matching contribution for the period of Plaintiff Petite's reinstatement.
(3) The USMS shall amend its records to reflect that Plaintiff Petite separated from the USMS on August 20, 1985.
(4) The USMS shall take all necessary action and supply all necessary information to the Office of Personnel Management for the purpose of calculating Plaintiff Petite's benefits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8336(c)(1) pertaining to civil service employees with twenty years of service as law enforcement officers, retroactive to the date of Plaintiff Petite's retirement, on August 20, 1985.
(6) This agreement is intended to resolve all of the disputes that currently exist or could exist between the parties involving their prior employer-employee relationship. The terms of this agreement constitute the entire agreement between the parties.
(7) The parties to this action have entered into this agreement as a compromise measure to terminate this action and resolve all issues in controversy between them, except for plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees, costs and expenses. In recognition of this fact, neither the terms of this agreement nor their substance may be offered, taken, construed, or introduced as evidence of liability or as an admission or statement of wrongdoing by the defendant, either in this action or in any subsequent proceeding of any nature.
(8) The parties further acknowledge that they are unable to resolve the issue of attorneys' fees, costs and expenses and, thus, agree to submit that issue to the Court for resolution.
GARY T. BROWN, Bar #246314
1130 17TH Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
J. RAMSEY JOHNSON, Bar #243253
United States Attorney
JOHN D. BATES, Bar #934927
Assistant United States Attorney
MADELYN E. JOHNSON, Bar #292318
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th Street, N.W. - Room 4213
Washington, D.C. 20001
APPROVED: Louis F. Oberdorfer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: May 17, 1993.
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