for review of the final order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1217(a)(3)(A). Defendant Walters argues that while the employees of the Executive Residence may be covered under the 1991 amendments of the Civil Rights Act, the only possible forum for judicial review of an adverse employment decision is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit--not this Court.
For the purpose of a motion to dismiss, all the facts as alleged by the plaintiff must be taken as true. Mr. Haddon is an employee at the Executive Residence--the White House. By statute, the President of the United States is authorized to "appoint and fix the pay of employees in the Executive Residence at the White House without regard to any other provision of law regulating the employment or compensation of persons in the Government service." 3 U.S.C.A. § 105 (b)(1). This statute on its face appears to establish that workers in the White House Executive Residence are employees at will. Nothing in the statutes referred to by Mr. Haddon contradict this conclusion. Nor is this position changed by the fact that previous White House employment disputes have been resolved by reference to E.E.O.C. procedures.
Attempts to limit the President's power to hire and fire those who work in his own home must be carefully and thoughtfully drawn. We speak here of individuals who occupy positions in close physical proximity to the President. Indeed the White House chefs are involved in one of the most intimate aspects of the First Family's lives--food preparation. To say that the President cannot with impunity fire, or delegate the authority to fire one of these employees is to strike at the very heart of the President's authority to manage his own household.
But beyond the question of limiting the President's ability to hire and fire his own domestic help, there is the added problem of providing a judicial forum for the resolution of claims by employees who have been let go. Without making any judgment on the truth of Mr. Haddon's allegations, it is undeniable that for this Court to subject the White House to all the burdens of civil discovery in an employment discrimination suit raises problems of constitutional magnitude. If the statute were interpreted to expose the President to the strictures of Title VII, then the President of the United States would be compelled to submit to interrogatories and depositions about his hiring practices in the Executive Residence. Had the Congress intended to so encumber the President in passing the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, or the 1991 Act to which the Government refers, it should have so specified in the text of the statute.
Fortunately, this Court need not rule on all of these difficult constitutional issues. It is enough to say that the employees of the Executive Residence are not covered by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this dispute.
United States District Court
ORDER - September 20, 1993, Filed
Upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's responses, and oral argument of the parties, for the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted.
United States District Court