Amtrak, it would not fall within the scope of Rule 1.
UTU argues that Amtrak's actions constitute a "major" dispute because the custom and practice, as of 1986, as attested to by UTU representatives primarily responsible for negotiating and interpreting the agreement, show that the contested work is clearly covered by Rule 1, and therefore, Amtrak's interpretation of the rule is "obviously insubstantial" and "not arguably justified." To the extent that train car movement work has been performed by non-UTU- represented employees, UTU contends that, depending on the site, the practice either violates Rule 1 or falls within Rule 38 of the agreement, which permits the movement of train cars by non-UTU- represented employees within a "confined area" reserved for servicing and repairing equipment under limited circumstances.
The Court finds that the dispute is minor in nature. The parties' relationship is governed and defined by an existing collective bargaining agreement. Rule 1 of the agreement, once defined, interpreted, and applied, will determine the validity of both parties' claims. Rule 1 does not specifically identify the work that belongs exclusively to the conductors, but rather identifies it by reference to work recognized as the exclusive work of the conductors as of January 29, 1986. Additionally, both parties have produced evidence that supports their interpretations of what was recognized in 1986 as the exclusive work of those employees. Therefore, Amtrak's reliance on Rule 1 to support the permissibility of its actions can hardly be said to be "obviously insubstantial." It is clear that the dispute in this case relates to the interpretation and application of an existing agreement.
As previously mentioned, minor disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration before the appropriate adjustment board, whose jurisdiction is exclusive. The district court does have the jurisdiction, however, to enjoin strikes arising out of minor disputes to preserve the jurisdiction of the adjustment board and to compel compliance with the procedures established by the Railway Labor Act.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 77 S. Ct. 635, 640-41, 1 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1957). Because UTU has threatened to strike over a minor dispute, issuance of a permanent injunction is appropriate in this case.
The findings made by the Court in its August 24, 1993, temporary restraining order remain true. Amtrak and the general public will suffer immediate, substantial, and irreparable injury if UTU engages in self-help in violation of the Railway Labor Act. The only way to prevent this occurrence is by an order continuing to enjoin such action. There is no adequate remedy available at law and injunctive relief must be granted. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction is granted (subject, of course, to the conclusion of the appropriate arbitration proceeding). Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
In the alternative, UTU moves for a conditional injunction. It argues that the Court, in its discretion, should condition any strike injunction issued on the return to the status quo ante, which UTU characterizes as the assignment of the contested work at Taylor Yard to the conductors.
While a minor dispute is in arbitration, each party is free to act under its interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 869 F.2d at 1520. The trial court, however, has discretion to condition the grant of an injunction on a return to the status quo where an injunction is necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 80 S. Ct. 1326, 1330, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1379 (1960); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 869 F.2d at 1520-21 n.2. The Court finds that a conditional injunction is not necessary under the circumstances presented here. First, the Court disagrees with UTU's characterization of the status quo. The contested work has been assigned to maintenance-of-equipment employees since Taylor Yard opened in October 1992. Therefore, the status quo is not the assignment of work to the conductors, but rather the assignment of work to maintenance-of-equipment employees. Second, a conditional injunction is not necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
Accordingly, it hereby is
ORDERED, that plaintiff's request for a permanent injunction is granted. The defendant labor organization, and the individual defendants, individually, and as officers or members or representatives of the conductors and assistant conductors employed by Amtrak, and each of them, their agents, successors, deputies, servants and employees, and all persons acting by, in concert with, through or under them, and each of them, or by or through their order, and all others acting in concert or in participation with them, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined from calling, permitting, instigating, authorizing, encouraging, participating in, approving of, or continuing any disruption of normal rail operations, including but not limited to strikes, picketing, slowdowns, concerted refusals to work, interference with equipment, sick-outs or other work stoppages, and all other acts in furtherance or in support thereof, in derogation of the procedures provided by the Railway Labor Act for the resolution of grievances with respect to the Metrolink work jurisdiction dispute. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that defendants' motion for a conditional injunction is denied. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied as moot.
Stanley S. Harris
United States District Judge
Date: SEP 27 1993