this Court as to the soundness of her account.
At the second hearing Officer Cook presented impressive circumstantial evidence that Delores Williams and Amrhu Dyce were acquainted with each other prior to May 6, 1993. The facts are as follows:
1) Amtrack computer records show that a train reservation was made for Dyce/A for travel from NYC Penn Station to Raleigh, N.C., departing May 6 at 9:42 am.
2) Amtrack computer records show that a train reservation was made for Williams/Delores for travel from NYC Penn Station to Raleigh, N.C., departing May 6 at 9:42 am.
3) Dyce's reservation was made on May 4 at 11:53 pm.
4) Williams' reservation was made on May 4 at 11:58 pm--five minutes after the Dyce reservation was made.
5) While these two reservations were made not during the same telephone call, both reservations listed the same call-back number: (718) 771-2586.
6) The telephone call-back number (718) 771-2586 is listed in the New York Telephone records as the number of an Arlene Williams, of Brooklyn, NY. At the time of her arrest, Delores Williams gave police the (718) 771-2586 number as her own phone number and listed Arlene Williams as her sister.
7) Williams picked up her ticket 19 minutes prior to departure.
8) Dyce picked up her ticket 17 minutes prior to departure, from the same ticket agent from whom Williams had received her ticket.
9) While the sleeping compartment assigned to Ms. Williams and the coach seat assigned to Ms. Dyce were separated by several train cars, Dyce had on her person a portion of Williams' ticket listing Williams' compartment number.
10) Ms. Dyce had on her person at the time of arrest a piece of paper with train information and the words "Sundown Inn Capital Blvd" written on it.
11) Delores Williams had in her possession at the time of arrest a business card for the Sundown Inn Motel on Capital Blvd. in Raleigh, North Carolina.
12) Ms. Dyce had made a prior reservation on an Amtrak train to travel to Raleigh on April 1, 1993, although the reservation was never ticketed. The call-back number listed for the April 1 train was (718) 771-2586.
13) There had been a reservation made for a D. Williams on the April 1 train.
After Investigator Cook presented these facts, Ms. Dyce then retook the stand and reasserted that she had never seen or known of Ms. Williams prior to May 6, 1993. Her explanation for the aforementioned series of links between herself and Ms. Williams is as follows:
Ms. Dyce was romantically involved with a man named Everton Griffith, of Jamaica. Mr. Griffith would periodically travel to Raleigh, North Carolina, call Dyce and ask that she visit him in Raleigh. Griffith would make the travel arrangements and call with train reservation and hotel information only a few days before Dyce was expected to travel to North Carolina. Dyce had travelled to the Raleigh area under these circumstances at least four times in 1993 prior to her arrest. The Sundown Inn was one of a number of hotels where she had stayed. Dyce would stay for maybe two days on each visit. Dyce was expected to pay for the train or bus tickets in cash and Griffith would reimburse her once she got to Raleigh.
According to Ms. Dyce, Griffith never asked Dyce to bring anything with her. Ms. Dyce had no knowledge as to why Griffith would use a Brooklyn telephone number as a call-back number. Dyce never asked Griffith what his business was or what he was doing in North Carolina. Dyce testified she had no knowledge of the drugs in her tote-bag. She claimed someone could have put the drugs in her bag while she was asleep.
Suppression of Tangible Evidence
Defendant bases her demand for suppression of the evidence seized from her tote-bag on her assertions that she did not consent to the warrantless search that Investigator Cook conducted. In the alternative, Dyce asks this Court to find that any consent that was given was involuntary, because of the oppressive circumstances that confronted Ms. Dyce as she was surrounded by the police. In cases such as this, the burden is on the government to establish that consent was validly obtained, not in violation of Ms. Dyce's rights. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968).
The Court finds that the government has met its burden of proving that the search of Ms. Dyce's tote-bag was conducted pursuant to freely given consent by Ms. Dyce. Investigator Cook did not seize Ms. Dyce within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until after the discovery of contraband in her tote-bag. Investigator Cook did not violate Ms. Dyce rights simply by asking to see her ticket. Florida v. Bostick, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
The Court finds that the search of the tote-bag was consensual. The officer was dressed in plain clothes, no weapon was displayed, and no threats of force were used. The encounter prior to her consent was relatively brief. All these factors militate towards a finding of voluntariness. United States v. Hall, 297 U.S. App. D.C. 102, 969 F.2d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 481, 121 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1992). Moreover, much of Ms. Dyce's testimony must be discounted because of the implausibility of her explanation for the links between herself and Ms. Williams. Other testimony of Mrs. Dyce is also suspect. It is this Court's finding that Ms. Dyce is not being truthful about a number of the events to which she testified. It is obvious to the Court that Ms. Dyce, an articulate and intelligent young woman, knows something more about Ms. Williams, Mr. Griffith, and the train reservations than she is willing to admit. In maintaining a clearly implausible account of her ignorance of Ms. Williams, Ms. Dyce undercuts the rest of her testimony about the events that transpired on the train prior to her arrest. Because the search of Ms. Dyce's tote-bag was consensual, the motion to suppress evidence taken from that tote-bag will be denied. See Florida v. Bostick, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (Fourth Amendment permits police officers to make inquiries of passengers on buses and request consent searches of their luggage); United States v. Caballero, 290 U.S. App. D.C. 235, 936 F.2d 1292, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (D.C. Cir. 1991) (consensual bus or train stops do not amount to seizures).
Suppression of Statements
The Court will suppress all statements made by Ms. Dyce between her arrest and her signing of form PD-47, the advice of rights card. The Court does not make this determination on the basis of credibility. Instead, this Court finds that the government has not provided adequate proof on the record that Ms. Dyce adequately understood her Miranda rights when Detective Larry Coates orally advised Ms. Dyce of her rights on the train platform. The testimony of Officer Pena is insufficient to carry the government's burden of establishing that Ms. Dyce was informed of her Miranda rights, that she understood those rights, and that she waived them voluntarily. Officer Pena testified that she could not hear exactly what was said by Detective Coates because she was occupied with doing other things at the time.
The Supreme Court held twenty-seven years ago that the government must take care to insure that a suspect in a criminal case is made fully aware of her right to remain silent. The Court's admonition in that famous case bears repeating here:
When an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence of interrogation can be used against him.