associated paper work. Mr. Garr's duties as Operations Manager, as spelled out in his job description, are to manage the day to day requirements of Goodwill's transportation, production and salvage departments. The Operations Manager is the immediate supervisor of all department heads and supervisors of the departments including the Soft Goods Manager.
The plaintiff's argument in opposition to the motion is that there is sufficient evidence in the record showing a material issue for trial, therefore, summary judgment should be denied. She maintains in her opposition to the motion that the jobs of Used Car Manager and Soft Goods Manager required equal skill in performance, equal effort, equal responsibility and were performed under similar working conditions. Upon close reading, the plaintiff essentially argues that the jobs required equal skill, effort and responsibility because both positions were supervisory ones and the persons occupying them generated management reports. Her argument that the jobs were performed under similar working conditions is the somewhat simplistic and conclusory one that the jobs were performed at the same Goodwill plant in the District of Columbia. These statements are not disputed and they do not satisfy plaintiff's burden of production under the summary judgment standard.
The plaintiff offers the affidavit of Earleen Hughes, the personnel Manager at Goodwill from October 1986 to January 1991 in support of her claims under the Act. With respect to the plaintiff's claim against Garr, Ms. Hughes compares the salaries of the Used Car Manager and the Soft Goods Manager while the plaintiff and Garr were both employed at Goodwill. The affidavit states that on the date of his hiring on May 18, 1988, Garr received an annual salary of $ 31,200.00 while on September 19, 1988, the plaintiff was paid $ 12,480 per year as Soft Goods Manager. It further states that the plaintiff's salary on the date of her termination on September 11, 1990 was $ 16,120 per year. It sheds no light, however, on the issue of the substantial equality of their respective jobs.
The plaintiff also suggests that Garr's own deposition testimony reveals that as Used Car Manager he was really a data entry clerk who supervised another data entry clerk and an employee who cleaned the automobiles. The passages of the deposition transcript cited by the plaintiff simply do not support such a conclusion. Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the record to support the plaintiff's characterization of events.
Finally, the plaintiff raises the issue of whether Mr. Garr priced the cars that were sold at auction. She contends that although the Used Car Manager was responsible for pricing the cars for sale and collecting the auction proceeds, the actual pricing of cars was done primarily by Lester Wofford, the Vice President of Operations. The defendants submitted, as a part of a supplement to their summary judgment motion, the affidavit of Lester Wofford in which he states that Mr. Garr was "responsible for the pricing of donated cars for resale." The plaintiff also deposed Mr. Wofford. In his deposition, he stated that Garr priced the donated cars that were sold at auction. The plaintiff had the opportunity to question Mr. Wofford about his statement but failed to do so.
The plaintiff similarly failed to take issue with Garr's statements under oath that he priced the donated cars. In a November 25, 1992 deposition, Garr testified that he "made decisions on what a car should sell for" and "put a price on what it should sell for." Again, the plaintiff had ample opportunity to examine Mr. Garr further about his assertions but apparently chose not to do so.
The plaintiff seems to take the position that a dispute as to whether Garr priced cars is a disputed material fact, therefore, she must survive summary judgment. The defendants posit that if Garr did indeed price the cars when he was employed as Used Car Manager, that responsibility is of such magnitude as to render any comparison of the two jobs under the Act meaningless. The Court is of the same view. The trust Goodwill chooses to place in an employee responsible for pricing goods sold at auction would seem to justify higher pay for that employee.
However, even if this Court were to accept as true the plaintiff's allegations that Garr's duties did not include the pricing of donated cars, the undisputed facts still would require granting the motion for summary judgment. The two jobs are not substantially equal as that term is defined in Thompson. Quite apart from the issue of pricing goods, the two jobs are sufficiently different both in responsibilities and day to day duties for this Court to find as a matter of law that the pay discrepancy between the plaintiff and Garr does not violate the provisions of the Equal Pay Act.
The defendants have carried their burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. The plaintiff has not offered evidence of a genuine issue for trial. The Court finds on the record before it that the jobs are not substantially equal under the Act and that the defendants are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims under the Act is granted. An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.
February 24, 1994
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff's claims under the Equal Pay Act. After a hearing on this motion and a review of the record in this case, it is this 24 day of February 1994
ORDERED that for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum opinion defendants' motion is granted.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE