deny it in part; the Court will deny the second motion to dismiss in its entirety.
Defendants challenge plaintiffs' "standing" to bring the section 1983 actions for the Title XIX violations. They rely not on the constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability, but rather on a prudential limitation articulated in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), "whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs' position a right to judicial relief."
Defendants further elaborate on their theory of standing in their allegation that "plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to show the existence of an express or implied enforceable private right accruing to themselves and members of the putative classes under the subject provisions of Title XIX." Defs.' Reply at 11. Standing, by this definition, is contingent upon the existence of a private federal right enforceable under section 1983. See Howe v. Ellenbecker, 8 F.3d 1258, 1261 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 128 L. Ed. 2d 49, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2522, 114 S. Ct. 1373 (March 28, 1994). With respect to plaintiffs' Title XIX claims, then, the "standing" question collapses into the question of whether section 1983 provides a remedy -- whether plaintiffs have a cause of action with respect to the relevant provisions of Title XIX.
A. Availability of Section 1983 Remedy for Title XIX Violations
The Supreme Court has long held that § 1983 is an available remedy for violations of federal statutes. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980). In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 110 L. Ed. 2d 455, 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990), the Court upheld such a remedy to allow private hospitals to enforce the "reasonable cost" reimbursement principles of the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid statute. Wilder established a "test," 496 U.S. at 509, to determine whether a federal statute creates a "right" enforceable under § 1983. First, a court must consider whether the statutory "provision was intended to benefit the putative plaintiff." 496 U.S. at 510. Next, the court must determine whether the statute reflects merely an unenforceable "'congressional preference' for a certain kind of conduct rather than an actionable binding obligation on the governmental unit." Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19, 67 L. Ed. 2d 694, 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981)). Finally, a § 1983 remedy is unavailable when the interest the plaintiff asserts is "too vague and amorphous such that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants have not argued that Medicaid recipients are not intended beneficiaries of Title XIX, nor have they argued that Title XIX obligations are "vague and amorphous" as the Wilder Court apparently understood these terms.
Thus, the question for the Court to resolve on this motion to dismiss is whether the relevant statutory provisions satisfy Wilder's "binding obligation" requirement.
In Suter v. Artist M, 118 L. Ed. 2d 1, 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), the Supreme Court precluded private party enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) under § 1983. As in this case, the Suter plaintiffs sought to enforce alleged rights created pursuant to the spending power of Congress. The Suter Court did not apply the Wilder criteria, but it did distinguish Wilder by contrasting the alleged "right-creating" statutory and regulatory requirements in both cases. The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has yet to determine the impact of Suter. See LaShawn A. by Moore v. Kelly, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 49, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 659, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994). This Court is not of the opinion that Wilder has been effectively overruled. Accord, e.g, Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 1992). Rather, the judicial task after Suter is to apply the Wilder criteria with attention to what the federal statute (and implementing regulations) "actually require" the state agency receiving federal funds to do. Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1368. If Congress leaves enforcement of its requirements "up to the state," Id., then no § 1983 remedy exists. If the congressional mandate imposes more specific or objective obligations on the state, see Wilder 496 U.S. at 514-20, then a private 1983 cause of action exists in the statutory beneficiaries to enforce those obligations. The Court will examine each of the statutory provisions implicated in this case under this standard.
1. Claim I -- Infants of Medicaid-Recipient Mothers
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(4) provides:
A child born to a woman eligible for and receiving medical assistance under a State plan on the date of the child's birth shall be deemed to have applied for medical assistance and to have been found eligible for such assistance under such plan so long as the child is a member of the woman's household and the woman remains (or would remain if pregnant) eligible for such assistance. During the period in which a child is deemed under the preceding sentence to be eligible for medical assistance, the medical assistance eligibility identification number of the mother shall be submitted and paid under such number (unless the State issues a separate identification number for the child before such period expires).