that it was not motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. at 257. Because defendant has shown that, indeed, plaintiff did violate the travel rules and the 30-day suspension is among the disciplinary actions available, the defendant has met its burden of production.
Because the Department of Interior has countered Mr. Shelton's prima facie case, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the reasons offered by the defendant are a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 253. A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by either directly persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason motivated the employer or indirectly showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. See Parker v. HUD, 282 U.S. App. D.C. 17, 891 F.2d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Here, plaintiff has persuaded the Court that anti-black bias animated from Mr. Ary and others, including Mr. Miller, at the Bureau of Mines. Additionally, plaintiff, through testimony offered at trial, has indirectly shown that the Department's proffered explanation for the 30-day sentence and the other acts endured by plaintiff are unworthy of credence. The Court finds that, indeed, Mr. Shelton was a victim of racial discrimination.
Title VII's prohibition against discharging includes the situation where an employer, while not actually and formally discharging an employee, makes conditions of continued employment intolerable so as to result in a "constructive discharge". See e.g., Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 252 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 788 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This Circuit requires a finding that "the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable and drove the employee into 'an involuntary quit'" Id. at 790 (citations omitted). Further, "in order to find constructive discharge in a case involving a claim of discrimination, a District Court must find not only intentional discrimination, but also 'aggravating factors.'" Dashnaw v. Pena, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 247, 12 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Clark v. Marsh, 214 U.S. App. D.C. 350, 665 F.2d 1168, 1172 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Katradis v. Dav-El of Washington, 270 U.S. App. D.C. 23, 846 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 252 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 788 F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals in outlining the proper standard to use when determining whether an employee was constructively discharged relied on the standard outlined by the Fifth Circuit: "a finding of constructive discharge requires a determination that 'working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.'" Clark, supra at 1173 (quoting Bourque v. Powell Electrical Manufacturing Company, 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980) (other citations omitted).
Because the Court has found that Mr. Shelton was a victim of racial discrimination, the first element of constructive discharge, intentional discrimination, has been met. The Court finds that the second element of aggravating factors has also been met. For example, the facts that Mr. Shelton had, since the arrival of Mr. Ary to the Bureau, been discriminated against, the predictable humiliation and loss of prestige accompanying the removal from his job description of his role as a liaison with the HBCU, the immediate return of that role as part of his replacement's job description and her promotion within six months of her arrival to the level of GS-15, and his exclusion from both conferences attended by other division chiefs and the presentation function at those conferences constitute the "aggravating factors" required by Clark. Clark, supra at 1175-76. Because the two elements of constructive discharge have been met, the Court finds that defendant deliberately made Mr. Shelton's "working conditions intolerable and drove him into 'an involuntary quit.'" Id. at 1176 (quoting Retail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. NLRB, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 419 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Title VII provides that when the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay and other equitable relief that the Court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Additionally, the statute provides for reasonable attorney fees and expert fees for the prevailing party. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Here, plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, backpay in the amount of $ 35,021.00, frontpay in the amount of $ 450,000.00, retroactive employee benefits and reasonable attorney's fees.
While the Court, consistent with the above, will enter judgment in favor of plaintiff as the prevailing party in an order being issued contemporaneously herewith, the Court will refrain from determining damages until an accounting has been provided to the Court as outlined in the aforementioned order.
April 26, 1994
HAROLD H. GREENE
United States District Judge
Upon consideration of the parties' motions, the trial and the entire record in this case, and in accordance with the Opinion issued contemporaneously herewith, it is this 26th day of April, 1994
ORDERED that the Court enters judgment in favor of Ronald Shelton and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff shall file an accounting on requested damages concerning backpay, frontpay, lost benefits, attorney's fees and other proposed equitable relief within 20 days of the issuance of this order and it is further
ORDERED that defendants may file any opposition to the above mentioned accounting within 30 days of the issuance of this order and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to transfer be an it is hereby denied as moot.
HAROLD H. GREENE
United States District Judge