The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOYCE C. LAMBERTH
This case comes before the court on motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction by defendants Lowitz and Shaw.
Upon consideration of the filings of counsel and the relevant law, the court finds that it does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendants and grants defendants' motions to dismiss in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
This case involves the creation and dissemination of an erroneous consumer report regarding plaintiff, Mr. James Russell Wiggins, Jr.
Plaintiff charges defendants Lowitz and Shaw with numerous violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and RICO, just to name a few in this inarticulately pled, twenty-two count complaint. Defendants Lowitz and Shaw have filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, claiming lack of sufficient personal contacts with the District of Columbia to support jurisdiction under the District of Columbia long-arm statute.
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
B. District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute
In order to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, service of process must be authorized by statute and must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cohane v. Arpeja-California, Inc., 385 A.2d 153, 158 (D.C.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 980, 58 L. Ed. 2d 651, 99 S. Ct. 567 (1978). Since the District of Columbia's long-arm statute has been held to extend as far as the Due Process Clause allows, Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006, 71 L. Ed. 2d 875, 102 S. Ct. 1643 (1982), personal jurisdiction exists when the defendant has purposely established minimum contacts with the forum state and when the exercise of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (citations omitted).
District of Columbia Code section 13-423(a) states the conditions under which a District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's-
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
. . .
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (1981 & Supp. 1993). Plaintiff's claim for relief must arise from the defendants' contacts with the District of Columbia and his "claims must bear some relation to the acts in the District that are relied upon to confer personal jurisdiction." Id. § 13-423(b); Bayles v. K-Mart Corp., 636 F. Supp. 852, 854 (D.D.C. 1986).
II. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff's allegations of defendants' contacts with the District fall into two general categories: actions related to their employment and acts in ...