On Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility
Before Terry and Sullivan, Associate Judges, and Gallagher,* Senior Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
PER CURIAM: This disciplinary matter is before the court on the report and recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board), to which respondent and Bar Counsel concur, that respondent be suspended for a period of one year nunc pro tunc to March 7, 1989. On that date, this court temporarily suspended respondent following his conviction of a "serious crime" within the meaning of D.C. App. R. XI, § 10 (b), namely, aiding and abetting the commission of a misdemeanor offense against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 (a) (4), and (b) (3) (1988). *fn1
The factual and procedural history of this matter are set forth in the Report and Recommendation of the Board, which we incorporate by reference and attach hereto as an appendix, and in this court's two prior opinions involving respondent. See In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (McBride II); In re McBride, 578 A.2d 1102 (D.C. 1990) (McBride I). Essentially, in McBride II, the en banc court reversed a decision by a division of this court in McBride I to permanently disbar respondent and remanded the case to the Board for a determination as to whether, "on the facts, McBride's conviction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028 (a)(4) and (b)(3) (1988) involves moral turpitude." McBride II, supra, 602 A.2d at 641.
We review the Board's recommendation in accordance with D.C. App. R. XI, § 9 (g) (1993), which provides, in part, as follows:
the Court shall accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended Disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent Dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.
Id. See also In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). We conclude that the Board's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and that the Board's recommended sanction is warranted and is not inconsistent with previous Dispositions for comparable conduct. See In re Kerr, 611 A.2d 551 (D.C. 1992); In re Thompson, 538 A.2d 247 (D.C. 1987); In re Hutchinson, supra.
Accordingly, Willard C. McBride is hereby suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for one year, nunc pro tunc to March 7, 1989. In view of the aberrational nature of respondent's misconduct, the remorse expressed by him for the misconduct, and his otherwise exemplary record, the court will not require direct respondent to furnish proof of rehabilitation as a condition of reinstatement pursuant to D.C. App. R. XI, § 3 (a)(2) (1993).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the Matter of WILLARD C. McBRIDE, Respondent
Bar Docket Number: 394-88
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
On August 31, 1988, Respondent pled guilty to, and was convicted of a misdemeanor for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4), i.e., willfully and knowingly aiding and abetting Patricia Shahid in the possession and use of an identification document in order fraudulently to induce the issuance of a United States passport. On March 7, 1989, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered Respondent suspended from the practice of law because he had been convicted of a "serious crime" within the meaning of D.C. App. R. XI, § 10(b). A division of the Court subsequently concluded that Respondent's criminal violation inherently involved moral turpitude and ordered his permanent disbarment. In re McBride, 578 A.2d 1102, 1103 (D.C. 1990). This decision was later overturned by the en banc Court, which held for the first time that misdemeanor offenses can never be crimes that ...