Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia; (Hon. Rufus G. King, III, Trial Judge). On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Elections and Ethics
Before Ferren and King, Associate Judges, and Pryor, Senior Judge.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: King
KING, Associate Judge: The proposed initiative measure in this consolidated appeal, petition, and cross-petition for review initially sought to amend the "Real Property Tax Revision Act of 1974," formerly codified in D.C. Code § 47-825, creating the Office of Public Advocate for Assessments and Taxation with authority to appear on behalf of the public in administrative property tax assessment proceedings. Intervenor/cross-petitioner Jay Hessey ("Hessey") submitted the initiative measure to appellee/respondent the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics ("the Board") on January 22, 1990, and is now before this court for the third time. See Hessey v. Burden, 584 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1990) (Hessey I); Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562 (D.C. 1992) (Hessey II). In the previous appeals, this court rejected challenges to the substance of the proposed initiative. The dispositive issue presented here, in the petition for review, is whether the Board correctly determined that the initiative petition contained the requisite number of valid elector signatures required to qualify the initiative measure for the ballot. We hold that it did not and, therefore, we reverse the Board on that issue and dismiss both the cross-petition for review and the appeal as moot.
The facts underlying the dispute are set forth in detail in Hessey I and Hessey II, and we will not repeat them here. In Hessey II, we held that the initiative measure was the proper subject of initiative, and we remanded the case with clear instructions that "given the tortuous path which the case has followed thus far, . . . the only matter properly before the court will be the opponents' challenge to the summary statement, short title, and legislative form." Hessey II, supra, 615 A.2d at 581. While on remand, however, the unanticipated occurred: The Council of the District of Columbia ("the Council") enacted the "Real Property Tax Assessment Appeal Process Revision Amendment Act of 1992" ("the 1992 amendments"), *fn1 repealing D.C. Code § 47-825 and enacting D.C. Code 47-825.1 (1993 Supp.) in its place. *fn2
Hessey thereafter moved to file a supplemental answer in the trial court, suggesting revisions to the summary statement, short title, and legislative form, in light of the amendments to the underlying statute. He also filed a renewed motion for summary judgment *fn3 which, if granted, essentially would require the Board to approve the initiative measure for further processing. Appellants Kenneth Price, James Durham, the Apartment and Office Building Association of Metropolitan Washington, and the Washington, D.C. Association of Realtors, Inc., (collectively referred to as "Price") and the Board opposed the motions, contending that Hessey should be required to file a new proposed initiative measure and begin the initiative process again since the underlying statute had been repealed.
On June 11, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to file the supplemental answer, ruling that the 1992 amendments did not affect the substance of the initiative. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice to its renewal after the Board had been given the opportunity to reformulate the summary statement, short title, and legislative form. *fn4 The Board, however, believing that it was without authority to make such changes, *fn5 declined to further process the initiative. *fn6
On July 27, 1993, Hessey filed a second renewed motion for summary judgment. On July 30, 1993, the trial court, after learning of the Board's refusal to reformulate, approved the final version of the summary statement and legislative form and entered summary judgment for Hessey. Price timely noted an appeal of the trial court's ruling, No. 93-CV-1052 ("the civil action"), contending the trial court exceeded its authority by reformulating the legislative form and summary statement. *fn7
At a hearing held on August 4, 1993, the Board certified the final version of the summary statement, short title, and legislative form. The Board also approved Hessey's initiative petition forms and determined that 13,233 valid elector signatures were required in order to certify the initiative measure for the ballot. In fixing the number of required signatures, the Board relied on the "Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Procedures Act of 1979" ("the IPA"), *fn8 specifically D.C. Code § 1-1320 (i). *fn9 Applying the provisions of that act, the Board determined that the November 1989 voter registration roll applied in calculating the requisite number of signatures that are required. Each party, or an attorney who represented each party, was present at the hearing, and although a memorandum regarding the signature requirement was distributed to counsel and the Board specifically asked if there were any objections, none was raised to the use of the November 1989 roll.
On January 31, 1994, Hessey filed the initiative petition, which contained 23,225 signatures, and the Board posted it for a ten-day comment period, pursuant to D.C. Code § 1-1320 (o)(1). Petitioners Herbert A. Behre, III, Joan Thurston-Tyree, and the Committee to Challenge Initiative No. 35 (collectively referred to as Behre") challenged the petition, contending that it did not contain the requisite number of valid signatures. Specifically, Behre contended that pursuant to the "Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977" ("the Charter Amendments"), *fn10 the Board should have relied on the December 1993 rather than the November 1989 voter registration roll. It is not disputed that if the December 1993 roll is the correct one, then 16,352 valid signatures would be required to qualify the initiative for the ballot.
On February 17, 1994, a challenge hearing was held regarding the petition. The Board, relying on D.C. Code § 1-1320 (i), denied Behre's challenge, finding that the petition contained 15,825 valid signatures. Since that number exceeded the 13,233 figure established by using the November 1989 roll, the petition was accepted for further processing. Behre then petitioned this court for review of the Board's action (No. 94-AA-248), contending the Board erred in ruling that the November 1989 roll was the applicable voter registration roll. *fn11
These consolidated appeals present a number of issues; however, as both counsel for the initiative opponents and the Board acknowledged at oral argument, if we hold that the Board erroneously failed to follow the Charter Amendments in determining the requisite number of valid elector signatures required in order to qualify the initiative measure for the ballot, then the appeal of the civil action and Hessey's cross-petition would be moot. See 3 DCMR § 1011.3 (1990). We will consider first, therefore, Behre's claim that the Board erred in applying the provision of the IPA rather than the Charter Amendments.
Behre contends the Board erred in relying on D.C. Code § 1-1320 (i), instead of the Charter Amendments, when it determined that Hessey had obtained the requisite number of valid signatures. The Charter Amendments were enacted in 1978, giving District residents the right of initiative, referendum, and recall. See D.C. Code ...