liability and that the BATF and IRS agents also were immune. Id. at 3-4.
The Court has reviewed both the transcript of the suppression hearing in the criminal case and the complaint and decision in the civil action. A review of the records in those cases demonstrates that the issues in this civil action are the same issues that were raised by plaintiff's motion to suppress in the criminal proceeding and in the civil action dismissed in Oregon. In those cases, as here, plaintiff argued that the agents' entry into his premises was not consensual, that the search was not consensual, that there was no probable cause to arrest, and that there was no probable cause for issuance of the subsequent search warrants. At the suppression hearing, at which he was represented by counsel, plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment issues he presented. The District Judge made specific findings of fact that the entry by law enforcement agents into plaintiff's premises on March 22, 1991, was consensual, that plaintiff's arrest was supported by probable cause, that the consent to search was voluntary and that the search warrants were valid and supported by probable cause. See United States v. Evanson, No. Cr. 91-60094 (D. Or. Oct. 13, 1991) (order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence).
As defendants point out, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the issue by the plaintiff in any other lawsuit involving a party to the first action. So long as the issue raised was actually litigated in the prior proceeding, was actually and necessarily determined by the court in the prior proceeding, and preclusion does not work an unfairness, a party that has once litigated the issue is precluded from doing so again. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 155, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 99 S. Ct. 970 (1979); UMWA 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 299 U.S. App. D.C. 339, 984 F.2d 469, 479 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3040 (1993); Connors v. Tanoma Min. Co. Inc., 293 U.S. App. D.C. 286, 953 F.2d 682, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980); McCord v. Bailey, 204 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 636 F.2d 606, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 983, 68 L. Ed. 2d 839, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981). This is so whether or not the first action was a criminal or a civil proceeding. Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270-72 (9th Cir. 1990); Byrd v. Smith, 693 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D.D.C. 1986). On this record, the Court concludes that plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the constitutional issues he raises because they have been previously litigated and determined against him.
Furthermore, since plaintiff has presented no viable claims with respect to any violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff has failed to meet his burden under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982), to show "a prima facie case of defendants' knowledge of impropriety, actual or constructive." Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1984); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139, 104 S. Ct. 3012 (1984). In view of the decision of the District Judge in Oregon after a full evidentiary hearing that the conduct of the agents was reasonable, it follows that the conduct of the agents and their superiors (the defendants here) did not violate "clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818. Because defendants neither violated any clearly established rights of plaintiff nor acted unreasonably in regard to the matters about which plaintiff complains (as determined in two other proceedings by two other judges), defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818-19; Hunter v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. App. D.C. 355, 943 F.2d 69, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
Finally, Assistant United States Attorney Deborah J. Dealy-Browning is entitled to absolute immunity in this action. A prosecutor is immune from personal liability from actions related to the performance of her public duties, including the actual prosecution of a case, the presentation of evidence before a grand jury, the obtaining of criminal complaints and warrants, the introduction of even illegally seized evidence and other actions undertaken in her role as advocate for the government. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-23, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976); Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023, 95 L. Ed. 2d 516, 107 S. Ct. 1910 (1987); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761 F.2d 242, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1985); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d at 30; Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981). Accordingly, defendant Deborah J. Dealy-Browning is protected in the exercise of her prosecutorial duties by the doctrine of absolute immunity, and the complaint against her must be dismissed.
For all of these reasons, the Court enters judgment in favor of the defendants and dismisses all claims against them with prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is entered this same day.
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion issued this same day, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment is GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment is entered for all defendants and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge