defendant of due process of law." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court cannot find such police coercion here. The Defendant asserts that his first statement to Officer Persons and others "was made while he was surrounded by numerous federal agents, once civilians had tackled him to the sidewalk." Motion at 8. However, arresting a suspect following gunfire at the White House is hardly police coercion; the Secret Service Officers were merely doing their job. Id. Thus, under Connelly, the Defendant's claim that the statement to Officer Persons was involuntary is wholly without merit.
With respect to the statements made to Special Agent Barry, the Defendant argues that the six to eight hours that elapsed between the time the events occurred at the White House and the time the statements were made, coupled with the questioning following invocation of Miranda rights and the imputed knowledge of the Defendant's alleged mental problems, constituted coercion which rendered the statements involuntary. The Court cannot agree. Under Connelly, there is no evidence before the Court that the delay was coercive or that during that time he was subjected to any coercive police behavior. Nor does the violation of Miranda, though clear, necessarily imply that the statement resulted from police coercion. Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 933, 108 S. Ct. 2832 (1988).
Finally, the Defendant argues that, by virtue of the offense and a note recovered from his person during a search incident to arrest, Special Agent Barry must have been alerted to the Defendant's "serious mental problems." Motion at 8. However, mental condition, "by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion," does not dispose of the voluntariness inquiry. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. And here, there is simply no evidence on the record of police coercion that exploited the Defendant's alleged mental problems. See Miller, 838 F.2d at 1537. Although Special Agent Barry's statement regarding the incident cannot in any way be condoned, the Court cannot find that the Defendant's response was involuntary, particularly in view of his subsequent indication of his wish to consult a lawyer and his eventual silence.
Accordingly, it is, by the Court, this 15 day of March, 1995,
ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as hereinafter provided; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's statements to Special Agent Barry on October 29, 1995 shall be, and hereby are, EXCLUDED from the Government's case-in-chief and unless and until the Defendant testifies, in accordance with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981); and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress his statement to Officer Persons following his arrest shall be, and hereby is, DENIED.
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT