be no court in which the case could be brought. 158 F.R.D. at 3. Because § 1818(n) lays venue in more than one court, Judge Greene did not find this line of cases controlling. Id. at 3-4. As a result, he relied on the maxim enunciated in Omni Capital International, Ltd. and held that "the omission from § 1818(n) of any language referring to process or personal jurisdiction appears to be indicative of Congress's intent not to authorize nationwide service of process." Id. at 4.
The only other written decision on this question also comes from this Court. In Office of Thrift Supervision v. Dobbs, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9053, 1990 WL 108965 (D.D.C. July 19, 1990), appeal dismissed as moot, 931 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991), Judge Royce Lamberth held that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) "clearly gives this court nationwide jurisdiction for enforcement of OTS subpoenas. . . . Congress provided a special grant of jurisdiction, not just venue, to each of the courts specified in § 1818(n), so that each can enforce an OTS subpoena." 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9053 at *4, 1990 WL 108965 at *2. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the similarities between § 1818(n) and the comparable provision of the Federal Trade Commission Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 49. Id., see Browning, 435 F.2d at 96.
In the instant case, not surprisingly, RTC relies on Dobbs. It also seeks to bolster the analysis contained in Dobbs by pointing directly to the language of the statute. Specifically, RTC emphasizes that the statute authorizes it to "apply to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia . . . for enforcement of any subpena or subpena duces tecum issued pursuant to this subsection, and [the United States District Court for the District Columbia] shall have jurisdiction and power to order and require compliance therewith." 18 U.S.C. § 1818(n) (emphasis added). Thus, RTC argues, this Court can enforce "any" subpoena; the statute's grant of "jurisdiction and power" refers to subject matter jurisdiction and the power to serve subpoenas nationwide.
The arguments of both parties are compelling. On the one hand is the Supreme Court's admonition that Congress knows how to authorize nationwide service of process expressly, Omni Capital international, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 106, which, in the statute at issue, it has failed to do. On the other hand, courts are instructed to give meaning to every term in a statute, see Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992), and it is difficult to conceive of a meaning for the term "power" in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) other than the power to serve subpoenas nationwide.
Nonetheless, it is not impossible to give independent meaning to the term "power"
in § 1818(n), and, in any event, "canons of construction are no more than rules of thumb". Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 112 S. Ct. at 1149. This Court, therefore, will rely on the reasoning of Omni Capital International, Ltd. Congress did not expressly authorize nationwide service of process in 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n), and, in the absence of any legislative history to the contrary, this Court will not liberally interpret the term "power" to imply such a grant of authority. This is particularly appropriate where, as here, the statute in question restricts neither subject matter jurisdiction nor venue to only one court. RTC's reading of the statute is certainly not implausible
, but it must fail.
For the reasons expressed above, it is hereby
ORDERED that respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted. This petition is dismissed. The RTC is, of course, free to bring this action in any court that has personal jurisdiction over Mr. LeChase.
IT is SO ORDERED.
May 24, 1995
JOYCE HENS GREEN
United States District Judge