case of the bisexual superior [who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon participation in a sexual affair], the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female employees alike." Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55.
The defendants omit that this dictum was clarified somewhat by Bundy. There the Court stated, "Only by a reduction ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex discrimination--where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike." Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 (citation omitted). Thus, it is fair to read Bundy to stand for the proposition that only in the rare case when the supervisor harasses both sexes equally can there be no sex discrimination. If, however, the supervisor singles out one sex, then the protections of Title VII are invoked. See also EEOC Compliance Manual, supra, at Ex. 1. Since Raney claims that his supervisors discriminated against males alone, (Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. S.J. at 3), his claim shall survive summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate only when, after viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact remain. Tao v. Freeh, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 185, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Because the EEOC's position, as well as the opinions cited earlier, support the view as expressed in Barnes and Bundy --i.e., sex discrimination occurs when an employee is faced with discriminatory treatment "which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced"--and since the defendants have presented this Court with nothing more than questionable precedent from other jurisdictions, the Court shall deny summary judgment for the defendants.
B. Compensatory Damages
The defendants' argue that the plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages because he points to no violation of Title VII which took place after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff contends, however, that the discrimination is still ongoing. Pl.'s Opp. The issue of damages is not dispositive of the claim and its resolution shall depend on the nature of the evidence received at trial. Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this ground is denied.
C. Abandoned Claims
The defendants correctly observe that the plaintiff reduced the scope of his claims in his pretrial statement, which was adopted as the Pretrial Order. The plaintiff now claims only violations of "the Civil Rights Act of the 1964 Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 of the United States and the Human Rights Act of the District of Columbia." Pl.'s Pretrial Stmt. at 2. Therefore, in view of the plaintiff's abandonment of the section 1981 and section 1983 claims, they shall be dismissed.
The Court also notes as a housekeeping matter that the plaintiff has abandoned a number of other claims originally alleged in his "Amendment to Complaint." These other claims, deemed abandoned and thereby dismissed, include all claims of religious discrimination, nepotism, and violations of District of Columbia regulations.
D. District of Columbia Human Rights Act
Next, the defendants cite Williams v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 140 (D.C. App. 1983), for the propositon that there is no private right of action for District of Columbia Government employees under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("HRA"). However, the court in Williams expressly left open the issue of whether a D.C. Government employee could obtain judicial review of an agency's determination of his administrative complaint if the employee had exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Id. at 142, n. 4. In the absence of a Local Rule 108 statement of facts, the Court cannot resolve this issue pretrial. Therefore the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim shall be denied.
E. Motion to Dismiss
Finally, inserted in the motion for summary judgment, the defendants move to dismiss the complaint against Director of Housing Malone on the grounds that it is redundant to sue both the District and one of its officers in his official capacity. Indeed Raney is suing the D.C. Government and "the Directors of the District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community Development, in their respective official capacities."
Compl. at 1. In a Title VII suit against the District of Columbia, only the District itself, and not its departments or agencies, may be the proper defendant. Zervas v. District of Columbia, 817 F. Supp. 148 (D.D.C. 1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b)). Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss the Title VII claims against Director Malone.
Accordingly, upon consideration of the defendants' Motion to File an Amended Answer to the Amended Complaint ; and the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment , the opposition, the reply, and the entire record, it is for the foregoing reasons this 5th day of July 1995
ORDERED that the Motion to File an Amended Answer to the Amended Complaint  is hereby DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII and District of Columbia Human Rights Act claims is DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's Title VII claims against Defendant Merrich T. Malone, and claims pertaining to religious discrimination, nepotism, violations of District of Columbia regulations and violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, shall be DISMISSED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that a scheduling conference to select a trial date is set for July 13, 1995 at 9:15 A.M. in Courtroom 25.
PATRICK J. ATTRIDGE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE