The opinion of the court was delivered by: SPORKIN
This matter arises under Title VII. Plaintiff, a white, Jewish male, alleges that he was the victim of racial as well as religious discrimination by the University of the District of Columbia ("UDC").
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that UDC hired a less qualified black, non-Jewish applicant to fill the position for which Plaintiff had also applied.
This case was originally filed in January 1991. At that time, the Plaintiff was appearing pro se. The case was provisionally dismissed on August 24, 1992. On May 5, 1993, the dismissal was vacated by the District Court and the case was reinstated. On May 25, 1993, the case was reassigned to this Court. After pre-trial motions, discovery and numerous requests for continuance, a bench trial was begun in this matter on April 24, 1995. During the third day of trial, additional documentary evidence was produced for the first time by Defendants. This required an adjournment of the proceedings until all relevant material could be produced and examined by Plaintiff. The Court also allowed Plaintiff to take such additional discovery as was made necessary by the production of the new documents. On November 28, 1995, the case was reconvened and the trial was completed.
Plaintiff brought this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seg., alleging race and religious discrimination on the part of UDC, its Board of Directors, Dean Philip Brach, Dean of the College of Engineering, Physical Science and Technology and Professor Alvin Darby, Chairperson of the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science.
In January 1986, Plaintiff applied for a position in the Department of Engineering at UDC. He was interviewed by both Dean Brach and Professor Darby. Plaintiff was also invited to give a guest lecture on a topic of his choosing. Although he was applying for a position as an engineering Professor, the Plaintiff prepared and gave a lecture on patent law for the electrical engineer. Plaintiff testified that while he was on the UDC campus for his interviews, he noticed that there were several public bulletin boards on which someone had posted material promoting the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Ultimately, UDC hired a black, non-Jewish male for the position.
In a Title VII action the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered were not true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Hence, the first step in analyzing a plaintiffs discrimination claim begins with the evaluation of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
To make out a case for discriminatory failure to hire as alleged in Plaintiffs complaint, the Plaintiff must show that "[he] belongs to a protected group, that [he] was qualified for and applied for a position, that [he] was considered for and denied the position, and that another individual not a member of the protected class was hired at the time that Plaintiff was rejected. See Bundy v. Jackson, 205 U.S. App. D.C. 444, 641 F.2d 934, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Racial Discrimination Claim
The trial record is clear that Plaintiff applied for and was rejected for a position in the Department of Electrical engineering and that a ...