The opinion of the court was delivered by: RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court in the above-captioned case is the defendants' Response to the Court's Show Cause Order, in which the defendants move to dismiss the above-captioned case for lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In this case the plaintiff inmate, a self-described practicing Jew, alleges that he was compelled to work during the Passover holiday in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights.
Upon careful consideration of the parties' pleadings, the entire record herein, and the law applicable thereto, the Court shall grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the defendant Krebbs in his individual capacity for lack of personal jurisdiction; the Court shall grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the defendant Federal Bureau of Prisons and the defendant Krebbs in his official capacity for monetary damages; and the Court shall transfer the plaintiff's claim for equitable relief to the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
The plaintiff, a federal prisoner, alleges that the defendant Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and defendant Art Krebbs, an employee in the Environmental Health Department of the federal correction facility in Springfield (MCFP Springfield), violated his rights under the Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that while an inmate at MCFP Springfield, the plaintiff obtained pre-approval from prison officials to take religious work holidays during Passover, yet the defendant Krebbs required the plaintiff to work during those days. The plaintiff seeks to recover compensatory damages for personal injury and mental anguish, punitive damages, an apology to the Jewish community, and all costs and fees.
On December 14, 1995,
this Court issued an Order in the above-captioned case directing the defendant to show cause as to whether the case should be dismissed and whether summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendants. In that Order, the Court stated that "any factual assertion(s) in the defendants' response will be accepted by the Court as being true and accurate unless the plaintiff submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion(s) . . . ." The Court further directed the plaintiff to file any opposition with the Court.
On January 5, 1996, the plaintiff, now an inmate at FMC Rochester, Minnesota, filed an objection to language of the Court's December 14, 1995 Order, stating that "it appears the bench has made a determination to grant summary judgment or dismiss . . . ." The plaintiff also stated that he had received and read the Court's Order.
The Court granted a number of enlargements of time requested by the defendants within which to reply to Court's show cause Order. On March 19, 1996, the Court received a motion by the plaintiff for an extension of time to April 15, 1996 to answer the defendants' motion for dismissal. However, the plaintiff never filed his opposition to the defendants' motion for dismissal. The Court will now address the sufficiency of the plaintiff's Complaint and the jurisdiction of the Court.
I. THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT KREBBS BECAUSE KREBBS IS NOT ALLEGED TO HAVE CONDUCTED ANY BUSINESS OR MADE ANY CONTRACTS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, NOR IS HE ALLEGED TO HAVE HARMED THE PLAINTIFF IN ANY WAY IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
The District of Columbia long-arm statute, D.C. Code § 13-423, is the only basis upon which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over defendants who do not reside within or maintain a principal place of business in the District of Columbia. Reuber v. United States, 242 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 750 F.2d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The statute provides that a court in the District of Columbia may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant with regard to a claim arising from the defendant's:
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District ...