show the documents to anyone or read them. See id. at 87-88 & 101. Instead, he immediately sealed them and then gave the sealed materials to Brown, who delivered them to Stevens. See Transcript at 101 (Vol. I-B); Transcript at 84-86 (Vol. II-B).
Eventually, all of the documents for which the defendants asserted attorney-client privilege were returned to their counsel. It is undisputed that Stevens and Corprew read those materials. However, neither the evidence at the hearing nor the in camera submission of over two boxes of electronic mail messages and other documents indicate that any privileged information flowed from the taint team to the prosecution team. Instead, the record and in camera materials reflect that Stevens and Corprew clearly appreciated the need for isolating their review from the prosecution and took steps on numerous occasions to ensure that the substantive information in potentially privileged documents was protected. Only those materials for which attorney-client privilege was not asserted were released to the prosecution team, and the record demonstrates that this was done only after the defendants were provided notice and an opportunity to claim privilege.
In the course of their assignment, Stevens and Corprew did not review the potentially privileged data that was stored electronically. Unlike the letterhead documents and other materials that were seized, however, there is no evidence demonstrating that the defendants ever asserted a claim of attorney-client privilege with respect to the computer material. See, e.g., Transcript at 107-08 (Vol. II-B). Nevertheless, in May and June of 1996, the government established a computer "taint team." It assigned Agent Ray Smith to download the files and Agent Harvey Barlow to review them for materials that were potentially privileged. See Government's Supplemental Submission Regarding Issues Arising from the Search Warrants, at App. 2. Potentially privileged materials were deleted from the files prior to providing the prosecution team with computer disks containing the seized electronic files. While it is undisputed that the prosecution team had access to the computers and electronic files, the agents testified persuasively that they did not access those files, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Significantly, two prosecution team members testified at the hearing that they lacked computer skills. See Transcript at 77 (Vol. II-B); Transcript at 8 (Vol. II-A).
II. Conclusions of Law
A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441 (1970); Coplon v. United States, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 103, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952). The attorney-client privilege, while it has not been elevated to the level of a constitutional right, see, e.g., United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 1992), is key to the constitutional guarantees of the right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. Coplon, 191 F.2d at 757. To provide effective assistance, a lawyer must be able to communicate freely without fear that his or her advice and legal strategy will be seized and used against the client in a criminal proceeding. See United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3rd Cir. 1978); United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1224 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950, 41 L. Ed. 2d 672, 94 S. Ct. 3080 (1974). One of the principal purposes of the attorney-client privilege is to promote the free and open exchange between the attorney and client, see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403, 48 L. Ed. 2d 39, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976), and substantial questions of fundamental fairness are raised where, in connection with a criminal prosecution, the government invades that privilege. It matters little whether the intrusion occurred prior to the initiation of formal adversary proceedings, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411, 92 S. Ct. 1877 (1972), because the right to a fair trial could be crippled by government interference with the attorney-client privilege long before the formal commencement of a criminal proceeding.
"An independent judiciary and a sacrosanct confidential relationship between lawyer and client are the bastions of an ordered liberty." Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 2 (3rd ed. 1997). Nonetheless, not every intrusion on the attorney-client privilege constitutes a constitutional violation. Under Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30, 97 S. Ct. 837 (1977), an intrusion may result in a constitutional violation if privileged information is intentionally obtained and used to the defendant's detriment at trial. Where government agents acquire privileged information, but do not communicate that information to the prosecutors, there is no Sixth Amendment violation. Id. at 555; see United States v. Kelly, 252 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 790 F.2d 130, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1986). While there is a presumption that the information is conveyed to the prosecution team, Briggs v. Goodwin, 225 U.S. App. D.C. 320, 698 F.2d 486, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984), the government may rebut that presumption by showing the existence of suitable safeguards, id. at 495 n.29, or by demonstrating that "there will be no prejudice to the defendants as a result of these communications." United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 908 (1st Cir. 1984). See generally Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to Counsel, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1143, 1150 (1984).
Under Weatherford and Kelly, four factors are relevant as to whether an alleged intrusion into the attorney-client privilege offends the Constitution: (1) whether evidence to be used at trial was obtained directly or indirectly by the government intrusion; (2) whether the intrusion was intentional; (3) whether the prosecution received otherwise confidential information about trial preparation or defense strategy as a result of the intrusion; and (4) whether the privileged information was used or will be used to the substantial detriment of the defendants. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558; Kelly, 790 F.2d at 137. While neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit have yet explained how these factors are to be weighed, and the other circuits remain split, see Kelly, 790 F.2d at 137 & n.5, it is clear that there must a substantial demonstration of prejudice before an indictment can be dismissed. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365, 66 L. Ed. 2d 564, 101 S. Ct. 665 (1981).
In this case, there can be no doubt that the government intentionally invaded the attorney-client privilege. The government all but concedes that materials subject to the privilege were reviewed during the execution of the search warrant and more were seized and sealed.
Stevens, an attorney assigned to the Department of Justice's Fraud Section, testified that she read most (but not all) of the potentially privileged materials to determine whether the crime-fraud exception applied. Moreover, at least one agent, PLA Rebecca Granger, read materials for which Defendant Denis Neill's counsel asserted privilege during the search of Denis Neill's home.
These intrusions were not accidental; they were deliberate and intentional.
While the parties dispute whether courts have sanctioned the Department of Justice's "taint team" procedures,
it is clear that the government's affirmative decision to invoke these procedures constitutes a per se intentional intrusion. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558; Kelly, 790 F.2d at 137.
Where the government chooses to take matters into its own hands rather than using the more traditional alternatives of submitting disputed documents under seal for in camera review by a neutral and detached magistrate or by court-appointed special masters, see, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570-71, 105 L. Ed. 2d 469, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Impounded Case, 840 F.2d 196, 202 (3rd Cir. 1988); In re Berkley and Company, 629 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Subpoena, 560 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1977); Hartford Assocs. v. United States, 792 F. Supp. 358, 367 (D.N.J. 1992), it bears the burden to rebut the presumption that tainted material was provided to the prosecution team. Briggs, 698 F.2d at 495 n.29 ("The government is, of course, free to rebut this presumption, by showing, for example, procedures in place to prevent such intragovernmental communications.").
However, an intrusion into the attorney-client privilege, standing alone, does not per se violate the Constitution. If the government demonstrates that no harm, that is, no privileged information regarding trial strategy or otherwise has been communicated to the prosecutors and used to the defendants' detriment, there is no constitutional violation. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558; Kelly, 790 F.2d at 137. In this instance, based upon the evidence and testimony offered at the evidentiary hearing, including the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses as well as the Court's review of voluminous materials submitted under seal for in camera inspection and the entire record in this matter, the Court is satisfied that the government has carried its burden to rebut the presumption of harm.
First, the government took precautions to shield the prosecution team from viewing potentially privileged materials during the execution of the search warrants. Only Agent Fort was present during the searches and then only for a short time. Fort testified persuasively that he did not read the content of any potentially privileged materials, and his testimony was not undermined on cross-examination or through other evidence. Second, the prosecution team witnesses testified that, to their knowledge, they received no privileged information from the agents who may have been exposed to potentially privileged materials, such as Agent Granger, the PLA on site during the search of Defendant Denis Neill's home. Finally, the taint team took sufficient precautions to ensure that the prosecution team did not have access to the potentially privileged documents or become aware of the content of those materials. When potentially privileged materials were later inadvertently discovered among the sixty boxes of seized items by Agent Fort, a prosecution team member, he acted responsibly by sealing the materials without reading them. He then had them delivered to the taint team for review.
The defendants contended at the evidentiary hearing (generally through bench conferences the transcripts of which have been sealed) that the government acquired information that will be used to their detriment. However, based on the Court's independent review of the defendants' sealed filing for in camera review (and contrary to the defendants' assertion), there is no evidence that the government acquired the defendants' trial theories or strategy. Compare Levy, 577 F.2d at 210 ("actual disclosure of defense strategy").
At most, the potentially privileged materials reviewed by the government contained facts identifying entities and persons. Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981) (distinguishing between protection provided to attorney-client communications and facts underlying those communications). While factual disclosures enabling the government to better investigate its case could rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation if substantial, see United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1991), the disclosure of facts is presumptively less harmful than the disclosure of trial strategy. Here the government has demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction that no privileged information, factual or otherwise, flowed from the taint team to the prosecution team. Consequently, there is no evidence of a harmful disclosure resulting from the taint team's review. The only information that the prosecution team may possibly have acquired arose from Agent Fort's inadvertent discovery of Earl Glock's identity. After the defendants' counsel reviewed the materials, Fort discovered the notebook with a tab marked "Earl Glock/Attorney-Client."
The inadvertent disclosure of this fact does not constitute constitutional harm.
In sum, the Court has not seen any potentially privileged materials that were seized and presumably
reviewed by the government and which can reasonably be construed as trial strategy. While some factual information was reviewed by the taint team, the record in this matter, including the in camera submissions, indicates that none flowed to the prosecution team. Agent Fort's discovery of the tab identifying "Earl Glock/Attorney-Client" can only be characterized as inadvertent. The defendants' argument that the government derived its factual knowledge from material protected by the attorney-client privilege is based on bare speculation, and, for the reasons stated above, it is rejected.
As to the computer files, the defendants' charge fails at the outset simply because they have not shown that they asserted the attorney-client privilege with respect to those materials. The proponent of the privilege bears the burden to establish its existence, United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 876 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (D.D.C. 1977), and absent the timely assertion of attorney-client privilege for each specific communication or document, no privilege will be recognized. United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992). Since there is no evidence of such an assertion by the defendants, it is unsurprising that neither Stevens nor Corprew were asked to review computer files. Indeed, Stevens testified that she was unaware of the existence of these files. Nonetheless, even though there was no claim of attorney-client privilege, the government did implement a computer taint team to review files on computer disks.
Absent the timely assertion of privilege, the defendants cannot now complain.
III. Defendant's Motion to Supplement the Record
Over a month after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the defendants filed a motion to Compel Production and to Supplement the Record of the November 4-5, 1996 Evidentiary Hearing ("Motion to Supplement the Record"). At the hearing, the Court consistently denied the defendants' request that the government be required to produce to the defendants copies of the government's internal memoranda, electronic mail and other materials which would reveal the government's deliberations. However, in response to the defendants' repeated requests, the Court eventually ordered the government to produce certain internal documents for in camera review. The government did so, to the tune of two very full boxes of materials which document the taint team's actions and trace internal Department of Justice communications to and from Stevens and Corprew.
The Court is not persuaded that additional disclosures are justified or that supplementation would be helpful to resolving the Motion to Dismiss.
The defendants support their motion by arguing fairness and noting specifically that the Court granted the government's request to supplement the record with a memorandum from Michael Shaheen of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility. See Order of December 9, 1996. The Shaheen memorandum simply reflects his finding that the Fraud Section engaged in no misconduct.
While the defendants did not object to the government's motion to file the Shaheen memorandum, the Court notes that this document was already available to her as part of Ms. Corprew's files, which were submitted for in camera review based upon the defendants' request at the evidentiary hearing. By granting the government's unopposed motion, the Court merely ensured that the Shaheen memorandum was also available to the defendants. The Court's Order of December 9th simply establishes no equitable ground upon which to grant the Motion to Supplement the Record.
In sum, the parties were provided a sufficient opportunity to develop the evidentiary record, and the defendants' request for disclosure of additional materials will be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Supplement the Record is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 17, 1997.
JOYCE HENS GREEN
United States District Judge