The opinion of the court was delivered by: HARRIS
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed jointly by defendants American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District Council 20 (the "Council") and Local 2094 (the "Local") (collectively, "AFSCME"), plaintiffs' opposition thereto, and defendants' reply, a motion to dismiss filed by American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (the "International"), plaintiffs' opposition thereto, and the International's reply, and a motion for summary judgment filed by Howard University and Howard University Hospital (collectively, "Howard"), and plaintiffs' opposition thereto. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Court grants defendants' motions. Although "findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56," Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), the Court nonetheless sets forth briefly its analysis.
This action arises out of a labor dispute. The Local and Howard are parties to a collective bargaining agreement. See AFSCME's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. B. On January 28, 1995, Howard notified a number of employees that their positions were being abolished as part of a reduction-in-force. The positions of about 70 employees, including plaintiffs', were terminated. Thereafter, several class action grievances were filed to protest the University's actions. AFSCME and the University consolidated the grievances into a single proceeding that ultimately was submitted for final and binding arbitration in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement. AFSCME's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A (Decl. of Lawrence N. Anderson).
Plaintiffs filed the instant hybrid claim against their former employer (Count I) and union (Count II) alleging wrongful discharge and a breach of the duty of fair representation.
A "hybrid" claim is one in which the employees have a claim both against the employer (for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185) and the union (for breach of the duty of fair representation). See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-65, 76 L. Ed. 2d 476, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983); see also George v. Local Union No. 639, 321 U.S. App. D.C. 394, 100 F.3d 1008, 1009 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In such a hybrid claim, "to prevail against either the company or the Union, . . . [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165 (internal quotations omitted).
I. AFSCME's Motion for Summary Judgment
In Count II of the complaint, plaintiffs contend that the union defendants breached the duty of fair representation.
Specifically, plaintiffs contend that AFSCME breached this duty by failing to file grievances, provide information to plaintiffs, and enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
AFSCME moves for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs have not established a breach of the duty of fair representation. Summary judgment may be granted against a non-moving party who "fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
A claim that a union has breached its duty of fair representation is evaluated to determine whether "'a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.'" Abrams v. Communications Workers of Am., 313 U.S. App. D.C. 385, 59 F.3d 1373, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 17 L. Ed. 2d 842, 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967)); see also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75-76, 113 L. Ed. 2d 51, 111 S. Ct. 1127 (1991); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 47 L. Ed. 2d 231, 96 S. Ct. 1048 (1976) ("To prevail against either the company or the Union, petitioners must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. . . . The grievance processes cannot be expected to be error-free."); Bellesfield v. RCA Communications, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 952, 955-56 (D.N.J. 1987) ("It is not enough for a member of the collective bargaining unit to show that the union committed a mistake in the prosecution of a grievance, nor is it sufficient to show negligence or poor judgment on the union's part.") (internal citations omitted). Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that AFSCME was arbitrary, discriminatory, or acted in bad faith.
Plaintiffs contend that AFSCME acted in bad faith by not processing their grievances. As evidence, plaintiffs contend that the Official Grievance Form was not dated and signed, see Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to AFSCME's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A., and plaintiffs were not notified about the class action grievance, asked to authorize the Union to sign it on their behalf, or given notice of meetings or copies of written replies from management. Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to AFSCME's Mot. for Summ. J. and Ex. B (affidavits of Donald Williams and Pernella Makins). These contentions, however, do not rebut defendants' contention that they processed the grievances. See AFSCME's Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A (Decl. of Lawrence N. Anderson). Moreover, plaintiffs do not advance any law to support their contention that the alleged procedural flaws constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. Conclusory allegations made in the complaint and in affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celex Group, Inc. v. Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Thus, because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that AFSCME breached its duty of fair representation, the Court enters summary judgment for AFSCME.
II. AFSCME International's Motion To Dismiss
Plaintiffs allege that the International breached its duty of fair representation by failing to have the Local perform its duties under the contract. International unions are distinct legal entities and, absent an agency relationship, are not vicariously liable for the activities of their locals or members. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212, 62 L. Ed. 2d 394, 100 S. Ct. 410 (1979); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 266 U.S. App. D.C. 362, 835 F.2d 1458, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Thus, plaintiffs have the burden of establishing that the International breached an independent duty of fair representation.