Firestone v. Firestone, 316 U.S. App. D.C. 152, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
In the present action, the court finds it futile to grant plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint because plaintiff cannot meet its burden of showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. In considering the amended complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to no relief because plaintiff fails to meet the statute of limitations. Moreover, even if plaintiff timely filed her complaint, plaintiff still fails to establish a claim under the Privacy Act.
B. Plaintiff's Claim For Damages Based On The Privacy Act19
i. Statute of Limitation
Plaintiff's complaint is barred by the two year statute of limitation under the Privacy Act. Plaintiff filed this action on August 4, 1995, seeking damages for alleged injuries which occurred from September 5, 1993 to October 20, 1994.
However, the record indicates that the alleged violation, which gave rise to this Privacy Act cause of action, arose as early as February 5, 1993.
Section 552 a (g)(5) provides that a cause of action under the Privacy Act must be filed within two years of the alleged violation, or within two years after plaintiff's discovery of the alleged violation
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has interpreted this to mean that the statute of limitation runs when the plaintiff knows or should know of the alleged violation. Tijerina v. Walters, 261 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 821 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that in a normal Privacy Act claim, the cause of action does not arise and the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff knows or should know of the alleged violation). Furthermore, this court has found that "new causes of action do not arise each and every time there is subsequent adverse determination based on the alleged incorrect records." Szymanski v. US Parole Comm., 870 F. Supp. 377, 378 n.4 (D.D.C. 1994), (citing Diliberti v. US, 817 F.2d 1259, 1264 (7th Cir. 1987)). If the suit is not filed within two years, the court simply no longer has subject matter jurisdiction. 870 F. Supp. at 378.
In the present case, plaintiff knew of defendant's alleged violation of her rights under the Privacy Act for more than two yeas. The evidence in the record demonstrates that plaintiff was aware of the alleged omission in her Second File as early as February 5, 1993. In a letter to Mr. Kelley, dated February 5, 1993, plaintiff wrote that "the fact that I am precluded from [camp placement] due to my escape history, I am requesting your assistance with locating my [First File] which would document a more recent furlough history and be more favorable to me."
This letter demonstrates that plaintiff believed that her Second File was not complete and that she was actively seeking to amend it. Furthermore, plaintiff's complaint states that she continuously south to access and amend her Second File from February 5, 1993 to October 20, 1994, without success.
Based on this evidence, the court concludes that plaintiff knew or should have known of the BOP's alleged violation of plaintiff's rights under the Privacy Act as early as February 5, 1993. Plaintiff, however, did not file the current action until August 4, 1995, two years and six months after she knew or should have known of the alleged violation. Thus plaintiff's suit falls outside the statue of limitation of the Privacy Act. Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff's Privacy Act claims are barred by the two year statute of limitation.
ii. Failure to State a Claim
Even if plaintiff's complaint was timely filed, plaintiff's complaint fails to satisfy the four-prong test in an action for damages under the Privacy Act. To prevail in a Privacy Act cause of action, plaintiff must establish four elements: (1) there was adverse determination; (2) the agency failed to maintain plaintiff's records with the degree of accuracy necessary to assure fairness in the determination; (3) the agency's failure was the proximate cause of the adverse determination, and (4) the agency acted intentionally or willfully in its failure. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a (d), (e)(5), (g)(1)(c), (g)(1)(d) and (g)(4) (1996); Dickson v. Office of Personnel Management, 264 U.S. App. D.C. 182, 828 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Deters v. U.S. Parole Comm., 318 U.S. App. D.C. 89, 85 F.3d 655 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
In the instant case, plaintiff fails to demonstrate the defendant intentionally and willfully neglected to properly maintain her record. In order for civil remedies to be awarded against an agency, the agency must have acted in a manner that was "intentional or willful." § 552a (g)(4), Sellers v. BOP, 294 U.S. App. D.C. 361, 959 F.2d 307, 312 (D.C. Cir. 1992), Doe v. U.S., 261 U.S. App. D.C. 206, 821 F.2d 694, 695 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Deters, 85 F.3d at 657. The intentional or willful conduct under § 552a (g)(4) "refers only to the intentional or willful failure of the agency to abide by the Act, and not all voluntary actions which might otherwise inadvertently contravene one of the Act's strictures." Albright v. US, 235 U.S. App. D.C. 295, 732 F.2d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1984). To establish willful intent, a plaintiff must demonstrate something greater than gross negligence. Tijerina, 821 F.2d at 798. This can be shown when an agency acts "without grounds for believing it to be lawful or by flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the Act." Albright, 732 F.2d at 188-89. "The violation must be so patently egregious and unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it unlawful." Deters, 85 F.3d at 659, (citing Laningham v. US, 259 U.S. App. D.C. 115, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Here, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that defendant's alleged failure to incorporate plaintiff's First File with her Second File constitutes a flagrant disregard of plaintiff's rights under the Privacy Act. In support of her allegation that defendant intentionally or willfully violated the Privacy Act, plaintiff submitted her own affidavit and that of Teresa Kay, plaintiff's roommate at the prison.
Plaintiff's affidavit states that defendant's willful or intentional conduct can be established by showing a pattern of continuous lack of response to plaintiff's requests to update her file.
However, defendant's failure to supplement plaintiff's Second File was not a flagrant disregard of plaintiff's right under the Privacy Act because the BOP Program statement specifically states that prior files of inmates "shall not be combined with new sentence file."
In fact, defendant simply followed the BOP guidelines by not amending plaintiff's Second File to include information from plaintiff's First File. Accordingly, defendant's alleged conduct described in plaintiff's affidavit does not amount to the level of egregious and unlawful behavior and thus does not set forth a claim under the Privacy Act for which the court can grant relief.
Teresa Kay's affidavit discusses a phone conversation she overhead Ms. Emmons, a counselor at the prison, had regarding an inmate' furlough request.
According to Ms. Kay's affidavit, Ms. Emmons allegedly stated that "the furlough request wasn't going to be approved, and that [I] didn't want to be the one to get into trouble."
Furthermore, the affidavit states that Ms. Emmons allegedly placed the furlough request in another employee's box. Ms. Kay's affidavit does not identify the name of the inmate or the specificity of that unnamed inmates request. In any event, allocating one's work to another does not constitute patently egregious and unlawful conduct as contemplated in the Privacy Act.
C. Plaintiff's Action Against Unnamed Defendants
In addition to the BOP, plaintiff's complaint alleges that several federal agencies and unnamed individuals violated her rights under the Privacy Act for not properly maintaining her federal prison record
Defendant, however, argues that it is the only proper defendant in this case.
According to the Federal Bureau of Prison Program Statement 5800.09, the BOP is the only agency responsible for creating and maintaining the Inmate Central File for all inmates confined in federal prison facilities.
Since plaintiff's complaint alleges improper maintenance of her federal prison record, the court concludes that the BOP is the only proper defendant in this action, and dismisses all other federal agencies listed in plaintiff's complaint.
With regard to plaintiff's allegation that several unnamed individuals improperly denied her access to her prison record, the court notes that the Privacy Act does not allow a person to seek civil remedies against individuals. Pursuant to section 552a(g)(1) of Title 5 of the United States Code, "the individual may bring a civil action against the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). The term "agency" is defined to include 'any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government ... or any independent regulatory agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(1)(f). The term does not include individual officers or employees of an agency. See Williams v. McCausland, 791 F. Supp. 992, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Moreover, there is no provision in the federal statutes or federal rules of civil procedure for the use of fictitious defendants. Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51 (D.D.C. 1975), McAllister v. Henderson, 698 F. Supp. 865 868 (N.D. Ala. 1988). Accordingly, the court dismisses plaintiff's claims against these unidentified individuals.
For the reasons stated above, the court denies plaintiff's motion to amend complaint as futile, and grants defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, it is this 7th day of August, 1997,
A separate Order for Entry of Judgment accompanies this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Ricardo M. Urbina
United States District Judge
ORDER - FILED AUG 8 - 1997
Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint and defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record herein, the court denies plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint as futile and grants defendant's motion for summary judgment for the reasons set forth in a Memorandum Opinion and Order issued on the 7 day of August, 1997.
Accordingly, it is this 7 day of August, 1997,
ORDERED the Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint be and is hereby DENIED ; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED ; and it is
ORDERED that the above captioned case be and is hereby DISMISSED.
Ricardo M. Urbina
United States District Judge