This matter comes before the court on defendants' various motions for summary judgment on the discrimination claims of plaintiffs Hymavathi Nair, Donna L. Diewald, and Luther Dorsey. Plaintiffs are members of a group of employees and applicants permitted to proceed collectively against defendants
by this court pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued August 12, 1997 ("Hyman I"). The factual and procedural background of this case is set out fully in the court's September 26, 1997 memorandum opinion ("Hyman IV"), granting First Union's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' disparate impact claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. First Union's motions for summary judgment presently before the court address individual plaintiffs' claims of discrimination brought under the ADEA, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1977 ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code §§ 1-2501 et seq., and in the case of one plaintiff, Hymavathi Nair, a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Upon consideration of the written submissions of parties and the relevant law, the court will deny First Union's motions for summary judgment on these plaintiffs' ADEA and DCHRA claims and grant First Union's motion for summary judgment on the Section 1981 claim of Hymavathi Nair.
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). In this regard, "materiality is . . . a function of the applicable legal standard." Kowalczyk v. Department of Justice, 315 U.S. App. D.C. 286, 73 F.3d 386, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970). If summary judgment is to be denied, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). If the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial," summary judgment may be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Plaintiffs' Claims of Discrimination Brought Under the ADEA and the DCHRA
1. The Joint Scheduling Order
On August 12, 1996, this court entered a Joint Scheduling Order providing guidelines for the parties with respect to both discovery and dispositive motions. Paragraph 4 of this Order provides:
4. Discovery. Until the trial or trials of common issues, discovery will be limited to determination of common issues. The Court contemplates individualized discovery, if necessary, following the completion of the discovery on common issues and the trial or trials on those issues. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to abridge or alter in any way the right of either party to conduct discovery concerning individualized liability and damages issues and defenses to those matters after the conclusion of the trial or trials of common issues. The trial or trials of individualized liability and damages issues and defenses to those matters shall be deferred until after the initial phase(s) of trial.