actions. Claimant's contention raises another question of first impression here.
Several of claimant's contentions can be dismissed summarily, without further fact finding. Some of the law enforcement measures that Kimberly Honesty characterizes as "seizures" enjoy the express imprimatur of the Supreme Court and do not implicate her due process rights. The Court in Good Real Property endorsed the government's right to file ex parte a notice of lis pedens "to ensure that the property not be sold . . . prior to the forfeiture judgment," 510 U.S. at 58, even while it cautioned generally against the deprivation of "valuable rights of ownership, including the right of sale." Id. at 54. The government can take such action "without seizing the subject property," id. at 58, and thereby without triggering the due process rights to notice and a hearing.
Thus, the mere fact that the Government contacted Honesty's real estate agent and "informed him that there was a federal case against the property," Honesty Aff., at P 10, does not provide grounds for dismissal.
Moreover, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974), the Court upheld the ex parte seizure of property "that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given." See also Good, 510 U.S. at 52 (interpreting Calero-Toledo). The holding in Good Real Property is explicitly limited to the seizure of real property. See id. at 57. Consequently, Honesty cannot protest the seizure of cash proceeds from the sale of Burleigh Manor even if it deprives her of resources to meet her mortgage obligations on her residence at Jones Bridge Road. While she may face eviction if her lender forecloses on the residence, that "seizure" by a strictly private actor does not trigger the due process clause.
The United States evidently does not think much of Honesty's other arguments for dismissal either. But even assuming (without deciding) that the execution of an in rem arrest warrant is not a "seizure," and that the remedy for an unconstitutional seizure is not dismissal in any event, Honesty's remaining factual allegations merit closer attention. It remains an open question what government acts in the nature of an exercise of "dominion and control," United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267, 90 L. Ed. 1206, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946), short of a physical taking but beyond the posting of an arrest warrant and the filing of lis pendens, constitute a Good Real Property seizure. If the United States used its lis pendens notice on the Jones Bridge Road residence to induce Honesty to settle her Burleigh Manor claim--rather than strictly "to ensure that the property not be sold . . . prior to the forfeiture judgment," 510 U.S. at 58--it is at least arguable that Honesty suffers a due process violation and is entitled to some form of remedy.
In court on October 6, the United States represented that it would likely drop its charge against the Honesty residence if it prevailed against Burleigh Manor. According to Honesty, the government is using that charge in conjunction with the prospect of a bank foreclosure on the residence to pressure her to settle. She alleges,
The federal government . . . agreed to let the mortgage company sell the property but would have stopped them from making the sale if I had entered into an agreement with them about this case. I did not agree to their terms and so they were going to allow the mortgage company to sell.