suffered an adverse personnel action when the defendant failed to transfer her to another department. The D.C. Circuit has broadly defined adverse personnel action as any employment decision taken by the employer regardless of whether that decision adversely affects the promotion or causes other tangible or economic loss. Palmer v. Shultz, 259 U.S. App. D.C. 246, 815 F.2d 84, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Under Palmer, the defendant's failure to transfer the plaintiff out of her abusive working environment can be seen as an adverse personnel action. This failure to transfer required the plaintiff to continue working in a hostile environment, which ultimately led to her constructive discharge.
Finally, the plaintiff produced facts to establish the existence of a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse action. "'The causal connection component of the prima facie case may be established by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the adverse personnel action took place shortly after the activity.'" Hayes v. Shalala, 902 F. Supp. 259, 264 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting Mitchell v. Baldrige, 245 U.S. App. D.C. 60, 759 F.2d 80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Here, the record indicates that the defendant had actual knowledge of the plaintiff's protected activity because she filed several complaints with the defendant's management. Subsequent to these complaints, the defendant declined to transfer her out of her the abusive environment. Plaintiff alleges that this environment resulted in her constructive discharge from her employment. Given these facts, a reasonable jury could infer a causal link between her filing of complaints and the defendant's alleged adverse action against her. Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiff met her prima facie burden and denies defendant's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claims.
For the reasons stated above, the court grants Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denies it in part.
Accordingly, it is this 31st day of March, 1998,
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication be and is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Affidavits be and is hereby DENIED ; it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby GRANTED nunc pro tunc ; it is
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Order to Show Cause Re Contempt for Failure to Comply with Subpoena be and hereby is DENIED ; and it is
ORDERED that the above-captioned case is scheduled for a status hearing on April 14, 1998, at 11:00 A.M. E.S.T.
Ricardo M. Urbina
United States District Judge