The opinion of the court was delivered by: GREEN
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending are defendant Wilbert J. Drew's ("Drew" or "Mr. Drew") motions to either dismiss Counts 5-13 of the Indictment or to bifurcate those for a separate trial. For the reasons stated below, both motions will be denied.
The Government's theory of the case is that beginning in mid-October 1997, Renay Short-Drew ("Mrs. Drew"), a victim of domestic violence, sought and obtained temporary civil protection orders ("CPOs") against her husband. The Government alleges that Mr. Drew violated these CPOs by repeatedly calling Mrs. Drew on the telephone. On October 27, 1997, it is alleged that a one-year CPO was entered in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. According to the Government, it was the entry of that final CPO that was the catalyst for the events that gave rise to this case. It is alleged that at approximately 3:30 a.m. on November 2, 1997, Drew entered his family home in violation of the October 27, 1997 CPO and, among other things, attempted to shoot his wife with a shotgun.
In Count 1, the only federal count, Drew is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm while under a protective order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Counts 2-4 are D.C. Code violations (first-degree burglary, kidnaping while armed, and assault with intent to kill) that arise out of the same November 2nd events. Counts 5-13 are also D.C. Code violations, alleging violations of protective orders in the two weeks preceding and including November 2nd.
Mr. Drew argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Counts 5-13. Drew argues in the alternative that even if jurisdiction is present, Counts 5-13 should be severed or bifurcated to avoid undue prejudice to him.
A. Whether This Court Has Jurisdiction Over Counts 5-13
The jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia over D.C. Code violations is determined by reference to both federal and local law. As a matter of local law, Congress determined that this Court has jurisdiction over
Any offense under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia which offense is joined in the same information or indictment with any Federal offense.
D.C. Code § 11-502(3) (1995). The provision allowing joinder with "any Federal offense" is limited by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a nexus between the events giving rise to the separate counts in an indictment or information. See United States v. Johnson, 310 U.S. App. D.C. 249, 46 F.3d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Kember, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 685 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Mr. Drew argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Counts 5-13 because the nexus between the alleged violations of protection orders is too remote from the alleged events of the morning of November 2nd. The Government responds that the alleged violations of the CPOs in Counts 5-13 are intimately linked with, and culminated in, the alleged assault, and that it would seek admission of the evidence necessary to prove those Counts in any event. The close proximity in time combined with the nature of the alleged conduct giving rise to Counts 5-13 clearly is a sufficient nexus to provide jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 270, 562 F.2d 789, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
B. Whether Bifurcation of Trial Is Required or Desirable
The trial in this case may be bifurcated, or Counts 5-13 may be severed, if it appears that Mr. Drew would be prejudiced by the joinder of offenses in the indictment. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 14. Drew argues for bifurcation or severance on the ground that he would be prejudiced if the jury were to learn about the CPOs issued for ...