Before Terry and Steadman, Associate Judges, and Belson,
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam:
The Virginia State Bar's Fifth District Subcommittee found that respondent had violated a number of the Disciplinary Rules of the Virginia Bar in connection with his retention by a client in a divorce matter. On May 23, 1997, the subcommittee publicly reprimanded respondent with terms, including a $5,000 refund to the client and an additional $1,000 for attorneys' fees incurred. The Office of Bar Counsel for the District of Columbia forwarded a certified copy of the order of public reprimand to this court. We, in turn, entered an order referring the matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility for a recommendation whether identical, greater, or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline, or whether the Board elected to proceed de novo, pursuant to D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11.
In its clear and cogent Report and Recommendation to us, a copy of which is annexed hereto, *fn1 the Board on Professional Responsibility concludes that respondent's misconduct warrants a substantially different sanction in the District of Columbia under D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c)(4), because a public reprimand *fn1 falls substantially outside the range of sanctions that would have followed if respondent's misconduct had been proven in proceedings in this jurisdiction. *fn1 The Board recommends that Steinberg be suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for 30 days.
The Office of Bar Counsel has advised the court that it supports the Board's Report and Recommendation, and Steinberg has not filed an exception to the Board's recommendation. Where there is no timely opposition to the discipline recommended by the Board, "our standard of review of the Board's recommended sanction is . . . especially deferential." In re Ramacciotti, 683 A.2d 139, 140 (D.C. 1996) (citations omitted); see also D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(1). Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Andrew M. Steinberg, Esquire, is suspended from the practice of law for a period of thirty days. Respondent's attention is called to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14, including the affidavit requirement [720 A2d Page 902]
of subsection (g), and to the consequences of not timely complying with the requirements of section 14 set forth in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(c).