to set aside the court's previous order dismissing the suit (as
would be appropriately made under Rule 60(b)), but rather is a
wholly new, and different, action to enforce the defendants'
representations. Thus plaintiffs are not barred from bringing the
instant action by Rule 60(b).
Lastly, defendants claim this court lacks jurisdiction over
plaintiffs' current breach claim. Defendants maintain that the
1995 dismissal was based upon a settlement agreement, and that
only the D.C. Superior Court has jurisdiction to enforce
settlement agreements. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
511 U.S. 375, 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391.
The prior lawsuit was dismissed pursuant to an order of this
court that the case was moot. It was not dismissed pursuant to a
stipulation of settlement, nor did the order refer to, nor
incorporate the terms of any, settlement agreement. Accordingly,
on this ground alone, defendants' jurisdictional objection is
denied. However, even had the court dismissed the prior suit
pursuant to a settlement, this court would still have independent
subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. First,
plaintiffs' statutory claim arises under the Medicaid statute,
the enforcement of which creates a federal question within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990).
Second, jurisdiction over plaintiffs' breach claim is necessary
to enforce a prior order of this court, based as it was on the
defendants' representations that the plaintiffs' concerns had
been met. Courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction "to enable a
court to . . . manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority,
[and] effectuate its decrees." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391. Thus,
this court could rely on its inherent power to vindicate its
authority and effectuate its prior order in order to address
plaintiffs' current breach claim.
II. The Statutory Issue
Plaintiffs assert the defendants' current policy of excluding
Medicaid managed care services from the base element when
calculating the DSH payment contravenes the clear language of the
Medicaid statute. Defendants maintain the Medicaid statute gives
states discretion to include or exclude those costs as they see
The relevant portion of the Medicaid statute in this case
provides that the DSH payment adjustment must:
be in an amount equal to at least the product of (A)
the amount paid under the State plan to the hospital
for operating costs for inpatient hospital services
(of the kind described in section 1395ww (a)(4) of
this title), and (B) the hospital's disproportionate
share adjustment percentage (established under
section 1395ww (d)(5)(F)(iv) of this title).
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (c)(1).