The opinion of the court was delivered by: Urbina, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
This matter comes before the court on the defendant Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA")'s motion for
summary judgment. The plaintiff alleges that WMATA racially
discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et
seq., as amended ("Title VII") and the District of Columbia
Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 1-2501 et seq., as amended
("DCHRA").*fn1 Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that on
August 4, 1998, WMATA took a disciplinary action against him
because of his race and in retaliation for a discrimination
charge he had filed with the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in 1992. See Compl. ¶ 12.
WMATA contends that the court should dismiss both the
discrimination and retaliation claims. First, WMATA seeks to
dismiss the Title VII discrimination claim on the ground that the
plaintiff has shown neither an adverse employment action taken
against him nor any racially disparate treatment. See Def.'s
Mot. for Summ. J. at 6, 8, 10. Second, WMATA seeks to dismiss Mr.
Walker's Title VII retaliation claim on the ground that the
plaintiff filed the complaint untimely and has failed to exhaust
all available administrative remedies. See id. at 14, 15.
Lastly, WMATA seeks to dismiss the DCHRA claims on the ground
that it is an entity created by interstate compact and so is not
subject to DCHRA claims. See id. at 15-17.
For the reasons which follow, the court will grant the motion
for summary judgment and will dismiss the complaint in its
entirety with prejudice.
Tyrone Lloyd Walker is a 58-year-old African-American man who
has been employed by WMATA since June 1970. See Compl. ¶ 11;
Def.'s Statement of Material Facts as to Which There is No
Genuine Issue ("Def.'s SMF") ¶ 2; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.
In May 1992, Mr. Walker filed a discrimination charge against
WMATA with the EEOC that ultimately ended with a settlement in
April 1993.*fn2 See Compl. ¶ 12; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 7, 25.
The instant action arises out of the events of July 13, 1998,
when Mr. Walker was working as Station Manager at the Arlington
Cemetery Metrorail Station in Virginia. See Compl. ¶ 5; Def.'s
SMF ¶ 4; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 1. On that day, a female
patron asked Mr. Walker for directions and, he says, began
rubbing his arm. See id. Mr. Walker asked the female patron to
stop rubbing his arm, and when she did not stop, Mr. Walker
became upset and yelled at her. See Compl. ¶ 13; Def.'s SMF ¶
3. As related by WMATA, the patron's account of the incident is
different; the patron complained that Mr. Walker was rude in
response to her request for directions and "tried to embarrass
her." See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3. As a result, WMATA
reprimanded Mr. Walker by issuing a Notice of Caution and
Reinstruction against him on August 4, 1998. See Compl. ¶ 13;
Def.'s SMF ¶ 5. Believing that WMATA had issued the disciplinary
notice unlawfully, Mr. Walker filed a discrimination charge with
the EEOC on August 25, 1998. See Compl. ¶ 16; Def.'s SMF ¶ 5.
One month later, WMATA rescinded the Notice of Caution and
Reinstruction on September 24, 1998.*fn3 See Compl. ¶ 17;
Def.'s SMF ¶ 10. WMATA states, and Mr. Walker does not contest,
that the rescinded Notice can have no effect on his work duties,
salary, benefits or opportunities for training or promotion.
See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 8-10.
In his complaint, Mr. Walker alleges that WMATA racially
discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title
VII. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16. First, Mr. Walker contends that
WMATA issued the disciplinary notice on the basis of his race and
gave disparate treatment to a white co-worker in a similar
situation.*fn4 Id. ¶¶ 14, 15. Second, Mr. Walker contends that
WMATA issued the disciplinary notice in retaliation for his 1992
EEOC charge rather than as a genuine response to the patron's
complaint. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The
substantive law upon which
a claim rests determines which facts are "material." See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Skelton v. ACTION, 668 F. Supp. 25,
28 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 1988 WL 156306 (D.C.Cir. 1988). If a
fact bears upon an essential element of the legal claim, then it
is material; otherwise, it is not. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Skelton, 668
F. Supp. at 28. Only disputes over facts that can establish an
element of the claim, and thus might affect its ultimate
resolution, can create a "genuine issue" sufficient to preclude
summary judgment. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct.
2505; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party
bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues
of material fact and that the nonmoving party has failed to offer
sufficient evidence to support a valid legal claim. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In ruling on the motion, the court must
accept the factual allegations of the nonmoving party as true and
must draw all justifiable inferences therefrom in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
It is not sufficient, however, for the nonmoving party to
establish "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [nonmoving party's] position . . . there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmoving party]." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Borgo v.
Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 254 (D.C.Cir. 2000). If the evidence in
favor of the nonmoving party "is merely colorable, or is not
significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal
citations omitted).
Applying the foregoing standard, the court concludes that there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendant ...