The other contacts alleged by World Wide also fail the "arising from"
test. Publishing advertisements or mailing trade magazines in the forum
might not even provide the needed minimum contacts. See Volkswagen De
Mexico v. Germanischer Lloyd, 768 F. Supp. 1023 (holding that
advertisements that reach the district do not establish personal
jurisdiction). Even granting that these contacts meet the requirements
of due process they cannot meet the requirements under § 13-423(b).
The presence of subscribers to a trade magazine cannot be connected to
the creation of a conspiracy to breach a contract that was signed and
performed in Kazakhstan. The same is true of advertisements in area
newspapers. The alleged injury therefore cannot arise from these
For the reasons above this court lacks personal jurisdiction over
Nukem under the D.C. Long Arm Statute.
C. Anti-trust Claims as an Alternative Basis of Jurisdiction
The claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts are new additions to
World Wide's allegations, appearing for the first time in the Proposed
Second Amended Complaint. World Wide cites these acts as an alternative
grounds for jurisdiction. Presumably, although it is not expressly
indicated, World Wide hopes that the national service provisions of the
Clayton Act will give this court jurisdiction over Nukem. This approach
has been expressly rejected in recent decisions. See GTE New Media Serv.
Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. 2000). In GTE, the
defendant argued that the nation-wide service provisions of the Clayton
Act provided a basis for personal jurisdiction in every district of the
United States. See GTE, 199 F.3d at 1350. The court found that the
Clayton act required proper venue in order to satisfy jurisdictional
The venue analysis requires that this court perform the local contacts
test under the applicable long-arm statute. See In re Vitamins Antitrust
Litigation, 94 F. Supp.2d 26, 31 (D.D.C. 2000). As shown above, the
allegations by World Wide do not satisfy the requirements of the
long-arm provision, and therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction
under the Clayton Act.
D. RICO as an alternative basis of Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs also contend that jurisdiction may be based on the Federal
RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1965. A court in this jurisdiction has
held that the RICO service provision does provide for jurisdiction based
on a national contacts test as opposed to a local contacts test. See
Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65, 71 (D.D.C. 1992).
This ruling recognized that other jurisdictions have used a national
contacts test. See Omni Video Games, Inc. v. Wing Co., Ltd.,
754 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D.R.I. 1991); University Savings Assn. v. Bank of
New Haven, 765 F. Supp. 35, 36 (D.Conn. 1991); American Trade Partners
L.P. v. A-1 Int'l Importing Enter. Ltd., 755 F. Supp. 1292, 1302
(E.D.Pa. 1990). The Court in Dooley also recognized that this circuit
has not directly addressed the issue. See Dooley, 786 F. Supp. at 71.
This court declines to follow Dooley. In United States v. Dyncorp,
Inc., 924 F. Supp. 292, 297 (D.D.C. 1996), the court conducted a minimum
contacts due process analysis despite the nationwide service provision
in the False Claims Act. It is true that each statute must be
interpreted separately. See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 120 S.Ct. 1331, 146 L.Ed.2d 171 (2000)
("analysis of special venue provisions must be specific to the statute").
However, a comparison of the Clayton Act service provisions and the RICO
statute provisions does show a substantial similarity. Compare
18 U.S.C. § 1965 (a), (d) with 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b), (c). The
ruling in this circuit in GTE New Media Services, 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C.Cir.
2000), on the Clayton
Act postdates Dooley, and suggests that a national contacts test might
not apply. In addition, there is strong support to reject nationwide
jurisdiction in the Second Circuit. See PT United Can Co. Ltd. v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 138 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2nd Cir. 1998).
As the Second Circuit noted, the service provisions of the RICO
statute must be read together in order to be coherent. See PT United Can
Co., supra, 138 F.3d at 70. First, 1965(a) gives personal jurisdiction
over defendants when they reside, have an agent, or transact affairs in
the district. This is analogous to having minimum contacts within the
district. Then 1965(b) provides for nationwide jurisdiction over other
parties not residing in the district. 1965(c) provides for service of
subpoenas. Finally, 1965(d) provides for nationwide service of "all
other process". This clause should not invalidate the division in (a)
and (b) between resident and non-resident defendants. The statute seems
to provide for nationwide jurisdiction only when one of the defendants
has minimum contacts with the forum. This court rejects the notion that
the federal RICO statute would provide a basis for nation wide
jurisdiction. Since none of the defendants are subject to personal
jurisdiction in the District of Columbia the RICO statute does not allow
this court to assert jurisdiction.
E. Conspiracy Jurisdiction
Finally, World Wide alleges that Nukem is amenable to the court's
power under conspiracy jurisdiction. Most courts utilize conspiracy
jurisdiction warily and require that a plaintiff "plead with
particularity the conspiracy as well as the overt acts within the
forum." See Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan,
115 F.3d 1020, 1031 (D.C.Cir. 1997). For conspiracy jurisdiction to
function there must be a substantial act within the forum. See
Jungquist, supra, 115 F.3d at 1031.
World Wide names as Nukem's co-conspirators the embassy officials. The
only overt act alleged with particularity by World Wide involving the
conspiracy is the meeting at the embassy. World Wide fails to explain
how this meeting taking place after the crucial incidents had occurred
could have been used to "plan" the conspiracy. All of the other acts of
the conspiracy took place outside of the District of Columbia.
Consequently, a denial of personal jurisdiction under this theory is
For the reasons set forth above the proposed second amended complaint
would not survive a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Proposed Second
Amended Complaint is futile. Moreover, the defendants' motions to
dismiss the Amended Complaint shall be granted in a separate order filed
Upon consideration of the parties' motions, their oppositions and
replies, and the entire record in this case, and for the reasons set
forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to File Second Amended
Complaint [54-1] is DENIED, and
FURTHER ORDERED that Republic of Kazakhstan, State Committee for the
Republic of Kazakhstan, and Kazatomprom's motion to dismiss under the
act of state doctrine is GRANTED [21-1], and that defendant Nukem's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED [27-1].
ORDERED that Kazakhstan's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction [22-1] is DENIED as moot. Kazakhstan's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim [23-1] is DENIED as moot.
Kazakhstan's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration [24-2]
Kazatomprom's motion for joinder of motions [25-1] is DENIED as moot.
Kazatomprom's motion to dismiss [26-1] under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), (2)
are DENIED as moot.
Nukem's motion to file confidential material under seal [29-1] is
Nuclear Fuel Resources motion to strike affidavit [33-1] is DENIED as
World Wide Minerals motion for leave to take jurisdictional discovery
[34-1] is DENIED.
Nukem's motion to seal confidential material [46-1] is GRANTED.
World Wide's motion [53-1] to remove from public record and place
under seal the plaintiffs motion to strike submission is GRANTED.
This case now stands DISMISSED.
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