basis of disability, real or perceived, by placing him on limited duty,
restricting him to desk work and (for a limited period of time)
forbidding him from wearing his uniform and carrying his gun. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant perceives him to be disabled because he was
diagnosed with a Protein S deficiency in June 1996 and must take
prescription medication, Coumadin, to prevent his blood from clotting.
Before this Court is Defendant Charles H. Ramsey's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Upon consideration of
the parties' pleadings and the entire record herein, Defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings [# 15] is denied.
II. Statement of Facts*fn2
Plaintiff has been a police officer with the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department for over thirteen years. Plaintiff
alleges that he has regularly received positive performance evaluations
and has received two promotions, most recently to the position of
Supervisory Sergeant in May 1994. Plaintiff alleges that he performed
his full duties as Supervisory Sergeant from January 1997 through
December 1998, and that throughout that period he had informed the
Police and Fire Clinic ("the Clinic"), which is responsible for the
medical treatment of D.C. police officers, that he took the prescription
In December 1998 Plaintiff sprained his wrist in an off-duty car
accident. He promptly reported the accident to Defendant and submitted
to examination by the Clinic as required. He alleges he was "temporarily
disabled" for three weeks due to his sprain. When he returned to the
Clinic at the end of the three weeks, Plaintiff alleges that the
Clinic's physician told him he could not return to full duty solely
because he took Coumadin. According to Plaintiff, the physician's
rationale was that any severe trauma could lead to Plaintiff's death
from blood loss.
Defendant sent Plaintiff to an independent medical examiner
specializing in hematology and oncology, who prepared a report for the
Clinic on June 25, 1999, concluding that Plaintiff could return to full
duty. Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently sent to another doctor
who did not specialize in hematology, who prepared a report on August
19, 1999, that "recommended that Plaintiff be restricted to office
duties, but which allowed Plaintiff to perform ` full duty
activities.'" Complaint at 4. Plaintiff states that his treating
physician provided Defendant with a written report concluding that
Plaintiff could perform his full duties.
Defendant kept Plaintiff on limited duty until December 1999, when he
was finally granted permission to wear his uniform and badge and carry
his weapon but still restricted to office work. Plaintiff alleges that
other supervisors currently work substantial overtime and for outside
employers, but that Defendant prevents Plaintiff from doing either.
Plaintiff states that he filed a claim of disability discrimination
with the EEOC on August 12, 1999, and that the EEOC has authorized him
to bring suit. Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendant to
return Plaintiff to full duty, to pay his lost wages and benefits with
interest, to compensate him for pain and suffering, to pay punitive
damages, and to pay his costs. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to
prevent Defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future.
III. Standard of Review
Because this is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the Court must "view the facts presented in the pleadings
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 713 n. 7
(D.C.Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court
may not consider evidence "outside the scope of the complaint." Terry v.
Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1423 (D.C.Cir. 1996). The moving party must show
"that no material issue of fact remains to be solved, and that he or she
is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Haynesworth v.
Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1249 n. 11 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (citing numerous
A. Requirements for Bringing an ADA Claim
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a "qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). An individual has a "disability"
within the meaning of this section if he has, or is "regarded as having,"
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such an individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102
(2)(A) & (C) (emphasis added). "Major life activities" are defined as
"caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i). To
show that his ability to work is "substantially limited," Plaintiff must
show that he would be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform
either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3)(i).
To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove not only that
he is disabled or "regarded" as being disabled, but also that he is a
"qualified individual" under the Act (i.e., able to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodation), and that he has suffered an adverse employment action
because of his real or perceived disability. See Swanks v. WMATA,
179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir. 1999). Because there is no dispute regarding
whether Plaintiff is a "qualified individual," the Court will not
address this ADA element.
B. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges That He Is Regarded As Having
1. The Condition Resulting from Plaintiff's Medication is Considered
a Disability under the ADA
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has "regarded" him as disabled because
Plaintiff has a Protein S deficiency and takes medication to alleviate
this disease which has a side effect of blood thinning. Defendant
contends that Plaintiff is not disabled or regarded as disabled because,
while taking his medicine, "he has experienced no difficulty whatsoever."
Def.'s Mot. for J. on Pleadings at 6.