The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kessler, District Judge.
Plaintiff Neal F. Gasser, a District of Columbia police officer,
brings suit against his employer under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.*fn1
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has discriminated against him on the
basis of disability, real or perceived, by placing him on limited duty,
restricting him to desk work and (for a limited period of time)
forbidding him from wearing his uniform and carrying his gun. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant perceives him to be disabled because he was
diagnosed with a Protein S deficiency in June 1996 and must take
prescription medication, Coumadin, to prevent his blood from clotting.
Before this Court is Defendant Charles H. Ramsey's Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Upon consideration of
the parties' pleadings and the entire record herein, Defendant's motion
for judgment on the pleadings [# 15] is denied.
II. Statement of Facts*fn2
Plaintiff has been a police officer with the District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Department for over thirteen years. Plaintiff
alleges that he has regularly received positive performance evaluations
and has received two promotions, most recently to the position of
Supervisory Sergeant in May 1994. Plaintiff alleges that he performed
his full duties as Supervisory Sergeant from January 1997 through
December 1998, and that throughout that period he had informed the
Police and Fire Clinic ("the Clinic"), which is responsible for the
medical treatment of D.C. police officers, that he took the prescription
In December 1998 Plaintiff sprained his wrist in an off-duty car
accident. He promptly reported the accident to Defendant and submitted
to examination by the Clinic as required. He alleges he was "temporarily
disabled" for three weeks due to his sprain. When he returned to the
Clinic at the end of the three weeks, Plaintiff alleges that the
Clinic's physician told him he could not return to full duty solely
because he took Coumadin. According to Plaintiff, the physician's
rationale was that any severe trauma could lead to Plaintiff's death
from blood loss.
Defendant sent Plaintiff to an independent medical examiner
specializing in hematology and oncology, who prepared a report for the
Clinic on June 25, 1999, concluding that Plaintiff could return to full
duty. Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently sent to another doctor
who did not specialize in hematology, who prepared a report on August
19, 1999, that "recommended that Plaintiff be restricted to office
duties, but which allowed Plaintiff to perform ` full duty
activities.'" Complaint at 4. Plaintiff states that his treating
physician provided Defendant with a written report concluding that
Plaintiff could perform his full duties.
Defendant kept Plaintiff on limited duty until December 1999, when he
was finally granted permission to wear his uniform and badge and carry
his weapon but still restricted to office work. Plaintiff alleges that
other supervisors currently work substantial overtime and for outside
employers, but that Defendant prevents Plaintiff from doing either.
Plaintiff states that he filed a claim of disability discrimination
with the EEOC on August 12, 1999, and that the EEOC has authorized him
to bring suit. Plaintiff requests that this Court order Defendant to
return Plaintiff to full duty, to pay his lost wages and benefits with
interest, to compensate him for pain and suffering, to pay punitive
damages, and to pay his costs. Plaintiff also seeks an injunction to
prevent Defendant from engaging in similar conduct in the future.
Because this is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the Court must "view the facts presented in the pleadings
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party." Moore v. United States, 213 F.3d 705, 713 n. 7
(D.C.Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court
may not consider evidence "outside the scope of the complaint." Terry v.
Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1423 (D.C.Cir. 1996). The moving party must show
"that no material issue of fact remains to be solved, and that he or she
is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Haynesworth v.
Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1249 n. 11 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (citing numerous
A. Requirements for Bringing an ...