The opinion of the court was delivered by: Urbina, District Judge.
GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This civil-rights matter comes before the court on the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff,
Jacqueline J. Raymond ("the plaintiff" or "Ms. Raymond"), brings
this employment-discrimination case under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, and the Congressional
Accountability Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.*fn1 Ms. Raymond
alleges that: (1) the United States Capitol Police Board ("the
defendant" or "the Capitol Police Board") discriminated against
her on the basis of her race; (2) the defendant created a
hostile-work environment; and (3) the defendant retaliated
against her for making allegations of racial discrimination.
Specifically, Ms. Raymond claims that the defendant issued
parking tickets to African-American officers, including her, but
not to white officers who were parked in similar locations
without permits. She also asserts that the Capitol Police Board
failed to discipline a fellow officer who called her a "bitch."
Lastly, Ms. Raymond claims that as a result of her allegations
of racial discrimination, the Capitol Police Board retaliated by
withholding her paycheck while she was on sick leave and by
forcing her into retirement.
Ms. Raymond is an African-American woman. See Fourth Am.
Compl. ("Compl.") ¶ 5. She served as a Capitol Police Officer
from April 4, 1977 until May 31, 2000, when she reached the
Capitol Police's mandatory retirement age of 57. See Def.'s
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF") at 1. Ms.
Raymond received several letters of commendation during her
service. See Compl. ¶ 6.
On about March 30, 1999, Capitol Police Officer Carroll
Arnold, a white male officer, gave Ms. Raymond a ticket for
illegally parking in a zone without a permit. See Compl. ¶ 7.
At Ms. Raymond's request, Capitol Police Sergeant Philip G.
Gerber submitted the ticket to the inspector with a
recommendation that the ticket be withdrawn, which it later was.
See Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1. On April 5, 1999, Ms. Raymond
received a second ticket for parking in the same location
without a permit. See id., Ex. 2. Following the same
procedure, the ticket was cancelled. See Compl. ¶ 9. Sergeant
Gerber, however, ordered Ms. Raymond to park in her assigned
location. Ms. Raymond complied. See id. ¶ 11. She alleges,
however, that no white or male officer was given the same order.
At this time, Ms. Raymond told Sergeant Gerber that she
thought the tickets were racially motivated. See Compl. ¶ 8.
Ms. Raymond said she thought that white officers who had parked
in the same area were not ticketed. See id. The Capitol Police
Board says that Sergeant Gerber investigated this claim but
concluded that the tickets were not racially motivated. See
Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.
After the withdrawal of the second ticket, a fellow Capitol
Police Officer, Stephen G. McGeown, referred to Ms. Raymond as
"that bitch, that bitch, that bitch Jackie Raymond. She is the
cause of all of this." See Compl. ¶ 10. Ms. Raymond did not
hear this remark herself, but learned of it from Officer Arnold
L. Fields. See id. ¶ 12. The Capitol Police Board does not
dispute this incident. See Mot. for Summ. J. at 14. The next
day, Sergeant Gerber questioned Officer Fields about the
incident. See Compl. ¶ 13. Sergeant Gerber then disciplined
Officer McGeown by deducting eight hours of accrued leave. See
Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 6. In addition, at roll call, the
inspector announced that the Capitol Police were making efforts
to arrange parking spaces for the officers in a garage. See
Compl. ¶ 14. Sergeant Gerber also denounced the practice of
issuing parking tickets to fellow officers. See id. The
plaintiff alleges that after this speech, she was considered to
be a "trouble maker" and was ostracized by her colleagues. See
id. Ms. Raymond was unable to complete her shift that day, and
Sergeant Gerber gave her permission to go home. See id. ¶ 15.
The next day, Sergeant Gerber called Ms. Raymond at home to
try to convince her to return to work. See SUMF at 5. In
addition, Sergeant Gerber offered to assist Ms. Raymond with the
harassment problem by scheduling an appointment with a House of
Representatives Employee Assistance Program counselor. See id.
at 4-5. Ms. Raymond, however, never returned to work. See id.
at 6. Ms. Raymond took stress-related leave until her
mandatory-retirement date. See Compl. ¶ 28.
After the parties unsuccessfully tried to mediate, Ms. Raymond
filed a complaint in the United States District Court on April
25, 2000. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on June 26,
2000. The plaintiff then submitted her first amended
complaint.*fn2 Thereafter, the plaintiff submitted a third
and fourth amended complaint.*fn3 On March 13, 2001, the
defendant moved for summary judgment. To date, no discovery has
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and
evidence demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir. 1995).
To determine what facts are "material," a court must look to the
substantive law on which each claim rests. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution
could establish an element of a claim or defense, and therefore,
affect the outcome of the action. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor
and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. All evidence and the
inferences drawn therefrom must be considered in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. A nonmoving party, however,
must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence" in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary
judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party
"fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and in
which that party will bear the ultimate ...